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ABSTRACT
Irrigation farmers in the Lower Orange (Kakamas and Boegoeberg) and Lower Crocodile
rivers (between Nelspruit and Komatipoort) areas in South Africa were surveyed during
October 2003 in order to study whether water marketing has promoted efficiency in water
use. This study is a follow-up on research undertaken by Armitage (1999) in the Lower
Orange River area and Bate et al. (1999) in the Lower Crocodile River area. Factors
associated with future investment in irrigation farming were also studied in the Lower
Orange River Irrigation Scheme. Econometric procedures used included principal
component analysis, and logit and ridge regression. Results from the two areas will be
discussed separately.
Econometric resultsfor the Lower Orange Riverfarmers indicate that purchasers ofwater
rights produce lucrative export grapes and horticultural crops with relatively less raisin,
wine orjuice grapes and lessfield crops; are more specialised in production (table grapes);
have more livestock (probably liquidityfactor) and have a less negative view ofthefive-year
water license review period. The water market has facilitated a transfer ofwater use from
relatively lower value crops to relatively higher value crops, and also promoted the use of
more advanced irrigation technology. An investment model using Ridge Regression
indicates that the following variables are associated with increased future investment in
irrigationfarming; higher expectedprofitability and lower levels ofriskperception and risk
aversion (Arrow/Pratt). Results confirm thatfarmers who are more risk averse are likely to
invest less in the future as can be expected from theory. Policies that increase risk in
agriculture will have a significant negative effect onfuture investment in irrigation. What is
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significantfrom the results is that irrigationfarmers in the Lower Orange River area are
highly risk averse (down-side). Results also show thatfarmers who feel that water licenses
are not secure expect to invest less in the future. The latter effect is thus amplified, as
farmers appear to be highly risk averse. This has important policy implications, and
measures should be taken to improve the perceived security ofwater licenses. This could be
achieved by keeping farmers more informed about the practical implications of the New
Water Act (NWA) (Act 36 of1998) and, specifically, water licenses.
In the Lower Crocodile River area, almost all the water trades (permanent and rentals)
observed in this study were from farmers above the gorge to farmers below the gorge. It is
concluded that in the transfer ofwater some attributes in the purchasing area such as lower
production risk (sugar cane) and lowerfinancial risk and better cash flow (bananas and
sugar cane) were more important than the expected income per cubic meter ofwater. Water
supply in this area is highly irregular, while sampled farmers were again found to be
extremely risk averse especially asfar as down-side risk is concerned. The average water
price in this area in recent years (2002 to 2003) was between R2000 and R3000 per ha (l ha
= 8000 cubic meters). Buyers have large farms and are progressive farmers that purchase
(and rent) from many sellers (or lessors). It is concluded that information on water transfers
(sale prices and rents) is asymmetrical. Few permanent transfers have taken place in the
Crocodile River in recent years. It is concluded that there are reasons why transfers at
present are notprocessed, such as excess demandfor water (due to the irregularflow ofthe
Crocodile Riverj, and role players should discuss these reasons andpossible solutions before
further action is taken.
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The worldwide demand for water is increasing, due to, amongst other reasons, population
and economic growth, increasing industrialisation and urbanisation, and evolving
environmental demands. Increasing water demand in most areas of South Africa is
compounded by the factors of climatic variability, skewed regional distribution of water
resources with respect to areas experiencing economic growth, and deteriorating water
quality (Armitage, 1999). In many areas, in South Africa and in the rest of the world, it is
becoming difficult to meet those demands due to the high construction costs ofwater storage
and conveyance infrastructure, and the full appropriation of many water resources. Supply
side responses have become more expensive, and relief from the demand pressures will
require more effective water allocations and use of existing water resources.
This stage ofthe water economy's development is often referred to as its' mature phase'. A
water economy develops from an expansionary phase towards its mature phase. An
expansionary water economy is characterised by relatively low social cost ofexpanded water
use, in total and at the margin. As demand for water increases, new projects can be
developed on favourable sites. This gives the false impression that water is relatively cheap
(Randall, 1981). During this phase, analysis is mainly focused on cost benefit analysis and
project evaluation. The mature phase ofa water economy is characterised by a price inelastic
long-rilll supply ofimpoW1ded water, exacerbated by a high and growing demand for water; a
need for repair and renovation of aging projects; intense competition for water among
different sectors; major externality problems; and a high social cost ofsubsidising water (for
a comparison of these phases, see Appendix 1 on page 119) (Randall, 1981).
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Backeberg et al. (1996) maintain that South Africa has reached this phase in the sense that
water available for impoundment has become increasingly scarce, and that water storage
projects have become increasingly expensive to construct and maintain. The attention of
participants in the policy process in future will be focussed on the role ofprice in generating
revenues in order to finance new developments and maintain aging projects; dampening the
growth in the quantity ofwater demanded; and in promoting and directing the reallocation of
water in response to changing patterns ofscarcity, externalities, equity, and conflicts among
water users (Randall, 1981).
The agricultural sector in South Africa consumes 54 percent of water and is regarded as the
primary source ofwater savings (Nieuwoudt et al., 2003). It is also estimated that irrigation
produces 30 percent ofthe value of commodities in South African Agriculture. As well as
save water, irrigated agriculture will have to maintain and improve productivity in order to
meet growing food demand. This will require a policy environment that will facilitate an
optimal allocation of irrigation water. One such strategy is water marketing, as well-
functioning water markets increase the likelihood that water will be transferred to its highest
valued use, while the market attaches an opportunity cost to water, which in turn provides
incentives for conservation. Several recent studies recommended the strengthening and
support for water markets in South Africa (Conradie, 2002; Louw, 2001; Bate et aI., 1999;
Arrnitage, 1999; Mirrilees et al., 1994).
A new National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) (the Act, or the NWA) has been gazetted in
South Africa. This Act only guarantees rights to water for basic human needs and water to
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maintain environmental sustainability. The Act requires that farmers obtain water use
licences in order to use water for purposes beyond basic human needs and other general
authorisations (Government Gazette, 1998). In the interim, farmers must register their
historical water use as an Existing Lawful Water Use (ELWU) in order to continue
abstraction of water. The legislation makes provision for water trading as an option for
water allocation (Section 25 ofthe Act). Although the main approach to water management
is to a large extent centrally orientated, there is scope for the continued operation and
development of water markets.
In this study, the Lower Orange River is studied as the area has an active water market. This
study complements a study on water marketing in the Lower Orange River catchment
undertaken by Armitage (1999) during 1997 as efficiency in allocation ofwater rights in the
market situation was studied and the current study builds on the previous study. The
dynamics of the water market can be studied by comparing water trades in the current study
(2004) to those in the previous study. The current study has the following objectives:
(a) To assess whether or not the efficiency objectives of moving water from a lower
value use to a higher value use envisaged in 1999 have been realised. The purpose
would be to assess whether water marketing has promoted efficiency in the allocation
of water entitlements and whether farmers' expectations are realised. This will be
studied by comparing which farmers are buying, and which farmers are selling water.
(b) To study price trends in the water market.
(c) To study factors that affect future investment in irrigation farming. Efficiency in
water use and future investment are closely linked. Increased investment in new
irrigation technology promotes irrigation water use efficiency. Objective 'a' focuses
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on efficiency from a water allocation perspective, while objective 'c' focuses on
factors that affect future investment, which has an impact on efficiency of irrigation
water use. The focus is also on the farmers' perceptions of the security of the water
license, and the risk aversion of the farmers.
For the purpose of this study, farmers along the Lower Orange River near Kakamas and
Boegoeberg who purchased or sold water rights were interviewed during October 2003. The
questionnaire used for the survey is presented in Appendix 6 on page 124. Data were
analysed using Logit Regression to reveal the effect that trading has on allocative efficiency;
Ridge Regression to investigate the factors which affect investment, in order to remedy
multicollinearity; and Principal Component Analysis to combat multicollinearity and
maintain degrees of freedom.
The performance ofwater markets in the Crocodile River Government Water Control Area is
also studied as this river has also had an active water market. The flow of the Crocodile
River is highly irregular and the major dam in this river (Kwena) is presently (March 2004)
only 30 percent full (Holtzhauzen, 2004). Risk management in water use must therefore be
an important strategy. Also while an active water sales market has developed, water renting
is common. The markets will be studied not only as they function today but dynamic
features will also be researched by comparing the present situation with a past study by Bate
et at. (1999) in the same river. Farmers at the time when the studies by Bate et at. (1999) in
the Crocodile River and by Armitage (1999) in the Lower Orange River were undertaken
were concerned about the application ofthe NWA. When Armitage undertook this research,
water marketing in the Lower Orange River had ceased. This was probably due to
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uncertainty regarding how the Act would be implemented and how the farmers would be
affected. It is likely that farmers adopted a 'wait and see' attitude towards trading of water.
The proposed study also links with the current Water Research Commission (WRC) study on
the "Supportive role of the market mechanism in implementing the provisions of the new
Water Act." The research objectives in the Crocodile River and in the Orange River are the
same but conditions differ. The flow of the Orange River is more stable than the Crocodile
River, no renting occurs in the Orange River while it is common in the Crocodile River.
Water sales in the Orange River take a short period (2 months), while no transfers are
currently being approved in the Crocodile River although many irrigators have applied for
transfers. Similar to the Orange River study, the research objectives are:
(a) To study whether water marketing in the Crocodile River has promoted efficiency
and whether efficiency objectives envisaged in the Bate et al. 1999 study have been
realised.
(b) To study price trends in the water market.
(c) To investigate farmers' risk behaviour and risk strategies in water use.
The dissertation begins by reviewing the South African water laws, since it is important to be
aware of the institutional context within which the water market must operate. A literature
review is then presented to identify criteria and methods used for allocating water resources
and to discuss various features of water markets. The next chapter deals with the study
methodology used, and is followed by the survey results for each of the study areas. The
results from an econometric analysis are presented, and this is then followed by a discussion
and conclusion, which serves to summarise the important findings and recommendations.
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CHAPTER ONE
A REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN WATER LAW: 1956 - PRESENT
It is important to understand the legal framework within which water allocation in South
Africa must operate. The next sections discuss firstly, some points about the old Water Act
of 1956, and continue with a detailed discussion of the new Water Act of 1998.
1.1 The National Water Act of 1956
The previous Water Act (Act 54 of 1956) was based on the riparian right doctrine. This Act
regulated the control, conversion, and use of water. The power to exercise authority was
vested in the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry. The previous Act did not directly
specify water rights, as it only specified the mechanisms for determining and obtaining water
rights (Louw, 2001: 15). Water rights were defined in other documents, such as notices in
the Government Gazette, and in schedules for Government water schemes and irrigation
boards, amongst others (Backeberg et al., 1996). Owners who possessed land next to a
flowing river or stream could make reasonable use ofthe resource as long as enough was left
for downstream users.
1.2 The New National Water Act of 1998
The 1956 Act has been replaced by the new National Water Act (NWA) (Act 36 of 1998).
The NWA specifies that the government, as the public trustee ofthe nation's water resources
must ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a
sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons and in accordance with its
constitutional mandate (Government Gazette, 1998).
-6-
According to the Act, the following factors must be taken into account amongst others
(Government Gazette, 1998):
(a) meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations;
(b) promoting equitable access to water;
(e) redressing the results of past racial and gender discrimination;
(d) promoting the efficient, sustainable and beneficial use ofwater in the public interest;
(e) facilitating social and economic development;
(f) providing for growing demand for water use;
(g) protecting aquatic and associated ecosystems and their biological diversity;
(h) reducing and preventing pollution and degradation of water resources;
(i) meeting international obligations;
(;) promoting dam safety;
(k) managing floods and droughts.
Also, the Act specifies the following entitlements to water use:
• A person may use water in or from a water resource for purposes such as reasonable
domestic use, domestic gardening, animal watering, fire fighting and recreational use,
as set out in Schedule 1 (see Appendix 2 on page 120).
• A person may continue with an existing lawful water use in accordance with section
34 (see Appendix 3 on page 121).
• A person may use water in terms ofa general authorisation or licence under this Act.
• Any entitlement granted to a person by or under this Act replaces any right to use
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water which that person might otherwise have been able to enjoy or enforce under
any other law
(a) to take or use water;
(b) to obstruct or divert a flow of water;
(e) to affect the quality of any water;
(d) to receive any particular flow of water;
(e) to receive a flow of water of any particular quality; or
(f) to construct, operate or maintain any waterwork.
In terms of implementation of the new law, the Act requires that the Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) as the custodian of South Africa's water resources, should
provide aNational Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) as a framework for the management of
water resources in South Africa (Government Gazette, 1998).
The foundations of the NWRS are the National Water Policy (1997) and the NWA (1998).
The NWRS has four main objectives:
1. To establish the national framework for managing water resources;
2. To establish the framework for the preparation ofcatchment management strategies;
3. To provide information; and
4. To identify development opportunities and constraints (Republic of South Africa
(RSA), 2002).
In terms ofthe Act, The NWRS lays down three types ofwater use authorisations. These are
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(RSA, 2002):
• Schedule 1 uses - which permit the use ofrelatively small quantities ofwater mainly
for domestic purposes (including non-commercial gardening and stock-watering), but
also allows use in emergency situations and certain recreational purposes. Users
must have lawful access to the resource or permission to use the resource in order to
exercise this type of use authorization (RSA, 2002).
• General authorisations - which allow limited use, conditionally, without a licence.
Limits are placed on water use under general authorisations depending on the nature
of the use, and the capacity of the resource to accommodate the use without
significant degradation. Current general authorisations are described in Government
Notice No. 1191, 8 October 1999. These authorisations are mainly for areas that are
not priority areas and licences are not required for certain cases. According to the
aforementioned Government Notice, an eligible person may (RSA, 2002):
(a) abstract surface water at a rate of up to 25 litres per second:
(i) for the irrigation of up to 25 hectares of land, at 6 000 cubic metres
per hectare per annum; or
(ii) for purposes other than irrigation, up to 100 cubic metres on any
given day; and
(b) store up to 50 000 cubic metres of water.
• Water use licences - which are used to control water use that exceeds a Schedule 1
use, or which exceeds the limits imposed under general authorisations. As a
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transitional measure, the Act allows water use that was previously lawfully exercised
under any law to continue under the same conditions until it is formally licenced. A
licence to use water replaces all previous entitlements to use water for the purpose
specified in the licence, and is specific to the user to whom it was issued, to a
particular area or property and for a specific use for which it was issued. A licence is
valid for a maximum of40 years and must be reviewed by the responsible authority
at least every five years (RSA, 2002).
The conditions attached to licences may change during the life ofthe licence. Any condition,
except the licence period, may be amended on review (RSA, 2002). The details of renewal
and amendments to licences are outlined in section 49 of the Act (see Appendix 4 on page
122). The allocation of water use licences with insufficient duration could stifle farmers'
incentives to invest in new irrigation technology and in new irrigated agricultural
development. It is the opinion of the author that the duration of the licences should be
sufficiently long and be inherently secure in order to allow farmers to recover the expected
net income stream generated by any investments that they make.
1.2.1 Transfers of water use authorisations
Section 25 of the Act provides for the transfer of water use authorisations. However in the
preamble to the Act it is clear that the approach to water management is to a large extent still
centrally orientated:
"Recognizing that while water is a natural resource that belongs to all people, the
discriminatory laws andpractices ofthe past have prevented equal access to water, and use
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oil-vater resources. Acknowledging the National Government's overall responsibilityfor and
authority over the nation's water resources and their use, including the equitable allocation
of water for beneficial use, the redistribution of water, and international water matters;
Recognizing that the ultimate aim of water resource management is to achieve the
sustainable use ofwater for the benefit ofall users. " (Government Gazette, 1998)
However, the Act also contains many important aspects which will make is possible to
introduce a water market:
• There is a clear division between land rights and water rights.
• The power and duty of managing of water catchments will eventually be assigned to
Catchment Management Agencies (CMA) with representation of water user
associations.
• A responsibility of the CMA's will be to prepare water allocation strategies for each
catchment. It will, therefore, with the approval ofthe minister, be possible to include
water markets as a water allocation strategy in catchments (Louw, 2001: 262-263).
Section 25 of the NWA states (Government Gazette, 1998):
1. A water management institution may, at the request of a person authorised to use
water for irrigation under this Act, allow that person on a temporary basis and on
such conditions as the water management institution may determine, to use some or
all of that water for a different purpose, or to allow the use of some or all of that
water on another property in the same vicinity for the same or a similar purpose
(Government Gazette, 1998).
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2. A person holding an entitlement to use water from a water resource in respect ofany
land may sun-ender that entitlement or part of that entitlement -
(a) in order to facilitate a particular licence application under section 41 for the
use of water from the same resource in respect of other land; and
(b) on condition that the sun-ender only becomes effective if and when such
application is granted (Government Gazette, 1998).
3. The annual report ofa water management institution or a responsible authority, as the
case may be, must, in addition to any other information required under this Act,
contain details in respect of every permission granted under subsection (1) or every
application granted under subsection (2) (Government Gazette, 1998).
Section 25 of the Act thus provides for two distinct circumstances in which water use
authorisation may be transfen-ed - temporary and permanent transfers.
A temporary transfer of water may be authorised for in-igation either on the same property
for a different use, or to another property for the same or a similar use. The two properties,
for the latter case, may be or may not be owned by the same person. In general, temporary
transfers will be for one year only, with the option of applying for an extension of a further
year. Users must apply to the water management institution that has jurisdiction in the area
for permission to effect the transfer (RSA, 2002; Government Gazette, 1998).
Apermanent transfer ofwater may be effected by one user offering to sun-ender all or part of
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an allocation to facilitate a licence application by another user. Transfers of this nature
constitute trade in water use authorisations, which may be used to increase the efficiency of
water use by moving water from lower to higher value uses, or may increase equity ofaccess
to water. In the case ofpermanent transfers, the new licence application will be subject to all
the relevant requirements ofthe Act regarding applications for licences. Permanent transfers
become effective only when the new licence is granted. They may only be authorised by a
responsible authority, which may change the conditions of the new licence. One of the
conditions ofthe new licence may be that the new user must pay compensation to the original
licence holder. Both types of transfers (temporary or permanent) will only be permitted
where both the original and transferred water use are from the same water resource (RSA,
2002).
1.2.2 Water User Associations
There has been some realisation that government agencies do not have to manage all parts of
the system and many governments rely heavily on Water User Associations (WUAs). South
Africa has been divided into 19 water management areas, established in 1999 by Government
Notice No. 1160 (see Appendix 5 on page 123). These management areas will be governed
by CMAs, which are statutory bodies with jurisdiction over a defined management area.
Functions ofCMAs are to develop a catchment management strategy in line with the NWRS.
They will also coordinate the water-related activities of water users and other water
management institutions within water management areas. WUA's are co-operative
associations of individual users who wish to undertake water-related activities at a local level
for their mutual benefit. A WUA falls under the authority of the CMA in whose area of
jurisdiction it operates (RSA, 2002). From this it is clear that South Africa is moving
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towards a more decentralised system ofwater allocation. Although there is scope for market
transfers, the condition that the licence must be reviewed at least every five years reduces the
incentive to invest in irrigation farming and causes some uncertainty around the security of
water licences. The next chapter describes criteria for the allocation of water resources and
discusses past research in the selected survey areas.
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CHAPTER TWO
CRITERIA AND METHODS FOR ALLOCATING WATER RESOURCES
Appropriate means of resource allocation are necessary to promote and achieve optimal
allocation ofwater resources. There are many alternatives for water resource allocation, and
it is necessary to have some criteria that can be used to compare different methods of water
resource allocation.
2.1 Criteria for comparison of water allocation methods
Howe et al. (1986), list several criteria used to compare methods of water allocation:
• Flexibility in the allocation ofexisting water supplies which implies that the resource
can be shifted from use to use and from place to place as demand and other
conditions change, making it possible to equate marginal values over many uses with
least cost. It is not necessary that all water be subject to reallocation, only that there
exist a tradable margin within each major water-using area that is subject to relatively
low-cost reallocation.
• Only ifthe water user has security oftenure will he/she invest in and maintain water-
using systems. Security and flexibility need not be conflicting, as long as users can
voluntarily respond to incentives for reallocating water.
• The user must be confronted with the real opportunity cost ofthe resources available
for use. The opportunity cost is the stream ofnet benefits that are forgone when one
resource use alternative is chosen over other alternatives. The user must be
confronted with the opportunity costs associated with water use and transfer so that
their decisions are based on a complete assessment ofcosts and benefits (Saliba and
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Bush, ]987: 239). A competitive market that sets a market-clearing price directly
confronts the user with the real opportunity cost.
• A fourth criterion is predictability of the outcome and implementation ofthe process.
This is important so that uncertainty can be minimised. A major concern about a
change in an allocation system is the extent of the eventual reallocation and the
impacts of this. A predictable system would lessen these concerns.
• The prospective users should perceive the allocation process as equitable. Users
should be compensated for giving up water, and other users should not impose
uncompensated costs on other parties - an example of this would be the'no injury
rule' in the western USA - which includes injury from changes in points ofdiversion
or return flows.
• The allocation system should be politically and publicly acceptable, so that it serves
public values and objectives, and is accepted by various segments in society.
Winpenny (1994) identifies additional criteria of efficacy, administrative feasibility, and
sustainability. Efficacy refers to the ability ofwater allocation to change existing situations
and to strive towards policy goals. Administrative feasibility and sustainability refer to the
ability to implement and administer allocations and to institute necessary changes.
These criteria are closely related to economic efficiency. Flexibility allows equating
marginal values in the resource's various uses. Security of tenure and predictability
encourage investment in long-term production systems that will generate positive net
benefits. When opportunity costs are taken into account, and assuming a well-functioning
water market, water will more likely be put to its most valuable use. Ifthe allocation system
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includes public good values in evaluating alternative allocations, then water will be allocated
towards uses that achieve the highest aggregate net benefit level (Howe et aI., 1986).
In practice, there is a continuum between government control and a free market system in
allocating water (Walmsley, 1995). On the one extreme is centralised water management,
and on the other is decentralised water management. Dinar et aI., (1997) describe four
different water allocation mechanisms: marginal cost pricing, public allocation, water
markets, and user-based allocation. Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) identify three
processes of reallocation, namely, administrative control, opportunity cost pricing and
tradable water markets. However, due to the large body of literature already available on the
variety of resource allocation methods, and the South African context, this dissertation will
only discuss public allocation and water markets.
2.2 Public allocation of water
Under public allocation, a public or quasi-public water authority identifies water demands or
alternative uses and simply reallocates existing water allocations or rights to higher valued
users. The state decides which resources can be used by the system as a whole, and allocates
and distributes water within different parts ofthe system. Under this allocation method there
will undoubtedly be losers who will protest to reallocation of water away from them, so the
authority will have to negotiate with them, and devise a method ofcompensation (Rosegrant
and Binswanger, 1994).
Water has several distinguishing features that can define a role for public action. Large,
lumpy capital requirements and economies of scale in water infrastructure tend to create
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natural monopolies, which warrant government intervention in order to prevent overpricing.
The large size and long time horizons reduce incentives for private investment in the sector.
The uses of water within a river basin are interdependent, withdrawals in one part of the
basin reduce the availability of water for other users; and pollution by one user affects other
downstream users (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994). Some aspects ofwater activities are
public goods (e.g. flood control), which cannot accrue charges to an individual user. Water
resources are often developed because oftheir strategic importance for regional development
and for national security (Dinar et aI., 1997). Public allocation promotes equity objectives
and intends to ensure water supply to areas of insufficient quantity. It can protect the poor
and sustain environmental needs.
Public water allocation mechanisms are likely to be preoccupied with equity and concerns
with satisfying the perceived greater public good. Supplying water to water-deficient areas
leads to expensive publicly financed projects. The overall effect is that subsidised water
supply development replaces market mechanisms ofwater supply via transfers ofwater titles.
Prices, as a result, do not represent either the cost of water supply or its value to the user
(Dinar et aI., 1997).
Public allocation mechanisms do not create incentives for water users to conserve water and
improve water use efficiency. The dominant incentive is to comply with regulations or face
sanctions. In many cases, the state lacks the local information and ability to penalise. It is
relatively more efficient where there are fewer points to monitor. Implementing agencies
dealing with water resources have only sectoral responsibility and respond only to single
constituencies. This provides very little flexibility to respond to changing patterns ofwater
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demand (Dinar et a!., 1997).
Public allocation does not meet many of the criteria listed in section 2.1. As mentioned, there
is little flexibility in allocation. The outcome of a public allocation process may not be
predictable due to hidden agendas ofbureaucrats. Security of tenure is not guaranteed in the
long term since policies can be changed. A centralised authority does not have the necessary
information to determine the real opportunity cost of providing the resource. A public
allocation does however strive for equity in the allocation process, and it will by definition be
politically acceptable and, in some respects, be publicly acceptable. Administrative
allocations are more conductive to efficacy than water markets. The other water allocation
mechanism dealt with in this paper is water marketing. Water markets are the primary focus
of this dissertation and will be discussed in Chapter Three.
2.3 Past research on water marketing in South Africa
Water markets in the western USA have a long history and date back to 1882 (Howe. 1997).
Water marketing in South Africa is relatively more recent. Several local researchers have
strongly recommended the strengthening and support for these markets in South Africa
(Backeberg, 1995; Conradie, 2002; Louw, 2001; Bate et a!., 1999; Armitage, 1999, Mirrilees
et al., 1994; Nieuwoudt, 2000). As the present research is a follow-up on research by
Armitage (1999), and Bate et a!. (1999), these studies will be discussed in detail.
2.3.1 Past research on water marketing in the Lower Orange River
Armitage (1999) used discriminant analysis to distinguish between farmers who had bought
water rights (Buyers) and farmers who had either sold water rights or had not participated in
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any market transactions (Non-Buyers). The results showed that the most important variable
discriminating between the two groups was that Buyers were table grape farmers (F statistic
= 18.3) and had a higher estimated return per unit of water (F statistic = 14.9). This shows
that the water market in the Lower Orange River in 1997 was promoting the efficiency of
water use, as water tended to move to users with a higher estimated return per unit of water.
Armitage (1999) reported an average price (weighted asset value) for water trades in the
Lower River Orange of R3378 per hectare (for 1997) or 22.5 c/m3, with the water price
varying from as little as R800/hectare to as high as R5000/hectare. Closer examination ofthe
data shows that there were fewer Buyers (9) and more Sellers (21), while the number of
contracts per Buyer varied from one to 14, and contracts per Seller varied from one to two.
Purchase prices vary significantly, indicating that there may be asymmetric information
(Buyers are better informed about prices than Sellers). Comparisons with the current study
and the Armitage (1999) study are made in Chapter Eight where the survey data are
discussed.
2.3.2 Past research on water marketing in the Crocodile River
Bate et al. (1999) studied water market trading in the Crocodile River Basin. They estimated
the sale value of water between 18.75c/m3 and 22.75c/m3. A wide range of trade prices
(rental value) for water was observed ranging from zero to six cents/m3 with a modal of2.5
cents/m
3
. There were only a handful of buyers (four accounted for 90 percent of trade
volume) but 45 sellers. Twenty-three permanent trades and 46 temporary trades occurred.
Bate et al. (1999) concluded that the high variation in trade prices could be attributed to
asymmetric information between large buyers and many small sellers, with a large buyer
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paying different small sellers different prices, including a zero price. Most of the trades (97
percent by volume) are from farmers in the upper/middle Crocodile selling to farmers in the
lower Crocodile River. This is important, as trades from up- to down-river do not reduce
stream flow between buyer and seller, which is desirable for the environment.
Bate et al. (1999) noted that sugar cane production increased in spite of relatively lower
returns per hectare of land. This was attributed to the higher price stability in this industry
with fixed domestic sugar cane prices. According to Bate et al. (1999), water traded on
short-term leases is likely to be used on this crop as it is a shorter-term crop and production
can be changed more quickly. A negative externality of trade is that river flow may be
reduced causing increased concentration of industrial sewage and farming effluent.
However, several farmers only sought extra water as assurance against drought, so not all
supplies will have been used. Bate et al. (1999) estimated that out of 12 million m3 of water
traded, eight million m3 are actually used. They concluded that the main reason for buying
was to ensure a steady flow of water as insurance against drought, while expanding
production was of lesser importance. Risk thus played an important role in decisions. An
important reason for selling was that it was not practical to pump the water and topography
appears important. Whereas almost no rentals take place in the Lower Orange River, they
appear common in this area. The following chapter discusses various features of a water




FEATURES OF WATER MARKETS
For most commodities and inputs, allocation by markets has been the favoured solution of
economists (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994). However, the allocation ofwater resources
through water markets is not without problems. This chapter discusses the benefits of,
requirements for, and problems experienced in, water markets.
3.1 Benefits of well-functioning water markets
A well functioning water market meets the criteria for allocation, as stipulated by Howe et al.
(1986), better than most other alternatives for allocation. Such markets guarantee flexibility
in allocation while providing security of tenure (no one has to sell). The price established by
the market and the ability to transact via the market, forces the decision maker to take the
opportunity cost of water into account, and therefore provides the incentive to adopt water-
saving technology. In addition, market transactions assure fairness between buyer and seller,
since each party must be made better offotherwise no transaction would take place. Through
the market, water users are empowered by requiring their consent to any reallocation ofwater
and compensation of transferred water (Anderson and Leal, 1989).
Water markets are possible when individuals (and institutions) have a secure claim to water
that is transferable and separate from land. A secure supply of water increases producer
incentives to make long-term investments in water-saving production technology. Tradable
water-use rights provide incentives for the transfer of water from low valued to high valued
uses and for the improvement in water use efficiency through the introduction of an
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opportunity cost (Easter and Hearne, 1995). Water markets also allow decentralised
information to be brought to bear on water management decisions. Within a water market,
farmers can apply first hand knowledge of their land, hydrology, irrigation technology, and
relative profitability of alternative crops to determine how much water to apply and which
crops to produce (Anderson and Leal, 1989). Table 3.1 summarises the benefits ofeach type
of allocation method.





Security of tenure •








Source: Backeberg et al. (1996).
3.2 Requirements for the efficient operation of a water market
The efficient operation ofany market requires some necessary conditions to facilitate trading
(Louw, 2001: 48). These are:
• well defined, broad, durable and assured property rights,
• the physical and legal possibility for trading to occur,
• public information on the supply and demand for water, and
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• low transaction costs.
The way in which farmers use a resource such as water is dependent on the property rights
governing the resource. A property right refers to a set of entitlements that define the
owner's rights, privileges and limitations of the specific resource utilization. In order to
understand and explain property rights to water, there is a need to understand how rights to
water are defined and developed.
3.2.1 Water rights regimes
A water right is "a collectively recognised access to water resources under specific conditions
defined in the right, such as point of diversion, season, location and purpose of use, and
quantity of withdrawals" (Saliba & Bush, 1987: 1). According to Sampath (1992), water
rights are generally based on a variant or combination of the following three systems:
riparian rights, prior (appropriative) rights, and as was previously discussed, public
allocation.
Under the riparian rights doctrine, water rights are linked to land ownership: anyone who
possesses land next to a flowing river or stream may make reasonable use ofthe resource as
long as enough is left for downstream users. The location to which the water is diverted must
be adjacent to the water source otherwise the diversion is prohibited. Regions where water is
relatively abundant tend to make use of the riparian rights doctrine (Holden and Thobani,
1996). The rights entitle the landowner to a percentage of the water available for irrigation.
This structure of water rights spreads the risk of variability in water supply equally among
the shareholders (Nieuwoudt, 2000).
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Prior rights are based on the appropriation doctrine, under which the water right is acquired
by actual use over time (Sampath, 1992). Quotas are allocated to users on a first-come first-
served basis. Diversions of water under this regime are subject to the 'use it or lose it' rule.
For this reason 'sleeper' rights do not exist. This system is used extensively in the western
United States of America (USA) (Holden and Thobani, 1996; Nieuwoudt, 2000). Rights can
also be classed as senior rights and junior rights. Those users who established a beneficial
use of water earliest are given senior rights over users who established use later. This
provides certainty in supply as senior rights are met before junior rights (Nieuwoudt, 2000).
According to Saliba and Bush (1987: 23), property rights for water resources must have the
following characteristics: they must be well-defined and completely specified in the unit of
measurement, reliability, priority, and enforced so that all individuals know the privileges
and restrictions that a water right provides and requires, and also know the penalties for any
violation. In addition. in large river valleys where downstream users are dependent on the
return flows of upstream users, the right should account for these return flows. One way to
account for return flows is to restrict water transfers from one water district or area to another
to only the portion of the right that is actually consumed. However, this situation requires
measuring ofwater, which can often be costly and difficult to implement. Further, rights can
only be transferred from up-to down-stream in the western USA so that the users are
ultimately unaffected. Rights need to be exclusive so that the benefits and costs associated
with water use and transfer decisions accrue directly to the decision maker. They must also
be comprehensive so that all value generating aspects of water can be represented by water
rights, such as water quality and instream flows. Rights should be transferable, so that water
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right holders can respond to differing conditions and attractive offers by higher value users.
This accommodates changes in water uses from low value to high value uses. The right can
be actual ownership, a usufructuary right, or a contractual right of use. The right must be
specified in perpetuity or be of sufficient length to be valuable to a user (Simpson, 1992). If
rights and titles are secure, Government, or preferably courts, could have jurisdiction over
transactions.
3.2.2 Administration, infrastructure, and information issues
A water market requires an efficient administrative system that will prevent abuses of the
system and maintain the proper chain oftitle over the water rights. An authority is necessary
to legally sanction water trading, ensure legal formalities are adhered to, register the right,
enforce legislation and regulations, and resolve disputes among users (Armitage, 1999).
Water markets need infrastructure, as they can only be instituted where water can be
delivered. Infrastructure, such as dams and canals, needs to be established in areas where
water does not naturally How and where demand for water exists. Infrastructure, however.
can only be established where the users of water can bear the cost of creation of new
infrastructure. Any improvements needed for the physical transfer ofwater from the place of
use of the seller to the place of use of the buyer should be part of the transaction cost borne
by the parties involved in the transfer. Information regarding water prices, trades, and
availability should be readily available to potential buyers and sellers. Hydrological
information is also required to permit the right to be defined. Different types of information
are necessary for rational decision-making by water rights holders, such as information on
legal and hydrological characteristics of water rights, and the cost of alternate means of
obtaining water. This requires the existence of good data and monitoring systems (Louw,
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2001: 52).
3.3 Sources of market failure
Water markets seem to be a practical solution to many water allocation problems, but some
countries have not established them. The economic argument against trading water rests on
the perception ofmarket failure, which arises because ofvarying factors. One such factor is
high transaction costs which are attributable to the setting up of a new legal, regulatory and
institutional framework; defining, measuring and enforcing water rights; the identifying of
potential beneficial and profitable opportunities for trades (information costs); the costs of
negotiating the transfer and administrative costs surrounding the transfer (contracting costs);
the cost of monitoring possible third-party effects and other externalities resulting from a
transfer; the infrastructure costs ofmonitoring, mitigating and eliminating third-party effects;
and making necessary changes in water intakes and conveyance infrastructure to effect the
transfers (Holden and Thobani, 1996; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Young, 1986).
Table 3.2 overleaf summarises who bears these costs.
Under administrative allocation, all costs are borne by the authority or governing body within
the jurisdiction of the authority. In a market system, the water rights users bear the costs of
identifying opportunities and negotiating the transfers. The costs of conveyance and
mitigating third party effects fall on the buyers, and they would attempt to find those trades
which minimise the total of purchase price, conveyance and mitigation costs.
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Resolving conflicts Authority, Courts, Users
Source: Adapted from Rosegrant and Binswanger, (1994).
Authority, Courts, Users
On the other hand, administrative allocation may be subject to political pressures and
authorities may not have the same incentive to minimise the total cost of the transaction as
the buyer would (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994). In addition, a central authority may not
have access to the same information available to the individual users of water and cannot
make a decision based on as much information as a market would facilitate.
The institutional arrangements around which a market is designed and the regulations that it
is governed by, have a major impact on transaction costs (Armitage et aI., 1999). Excessive
regulation can create high transaction costs, which greatly reduce the benefit ofwater trading
(Rosegrant and Sch1eyer, 1994). Conversely, if there is very little regulation, then
unacceptable costs could be placed on the environment and third parties (Saliba & Bush,
1987: 236). In addition, with little regulation, transacting may become too risky.
Externalities or "third-party" effects are identified by Howe et al. (1986) as the main
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administrative problem in water markets. These externalities take the forms ofaltered return
flows, changed groundwater levels, and water quality changes. A water market transaction
will guarantee that both buyer and seller are made better off, but some third parties will gain
and others will lose. Gains can be from increased instream flows between the seller and the
buyer in the case of an up- to down-stream transaction and from a change in irrigation
activities which increase return flows or maintain water quality. Losses can occur when
reduced instream flows are experienced by users downstream from the buyer in the case ofa
down- to up-stream transaction and also from changes in irrigation activities which decrease
return flow or reduces water quality. These third party effects need to be accounted for in the
decision making process of the transacting parties and the losers should be compensated so
that no one is worse off as a result of the transfer (Howe et al., 1986). These effects need to
be identified and quantified as accurately and quickly as possible so that adjustments can be
made and/or compensation be paid and the transfer can be completed without excessive
transaction costs. This can be partially overcome by trading only the consumptive use by
water users. Consumptive use ofdifferent irrigation methods and different crops in various
regions could be estimated by hydrologists and some standards could be prescribed by a
public or private water authority, where necessary, to facilitate transactions.
There are also issues ofreturn flows, public goods aspects, and equity considerations, which
oppose markets. Other arguments have been identified by Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994).
These authors add that the high costs of investment needed to develop markets are
exacerbated by the relatively low value ofwater in developing countries. They also identify
externalities as a major problem in the establishment of water markets.
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Since these problems exist and are not easily overcome, public institutions are required in
some aspects of a water market. Some of their roles are protection against third party
impairment from trades and to resolve conflicts among water users (Rosegrant and
Binswanger, 1994). These institutions need to be decentralised so that they can make use of
local information, which is unique to certain areas, in order to make informed decisions.
Despite the many obstacles to water markets, many countries have successfully introduced
them, such as the western USA, Australia, Pakistan, Chile and Mexico (Holden and Thobani,
(1996); Nieuwoudt, (2000); Bjornlund and McKay, (1996)).
The following chapter discusses the survey methodology. It outlines the hypothesised model
and describes the statistical techniques that are used in the estimation of the models. The




This chapter is arranged in three sections. The first section outlines the hypothesised
economic model of water transfers. The second section describes the statistical techniques
that are used to estimate the models. The third section introduces and discusses the study
areas of the Lower Orange and Crocodile Rivers.
4.1 The economic model of water transfers
The theoretical economic model was based on the hypothesis that water is likely to be
transferred from farmers who have a low return per unit of water because of climatic or soil
conditions to farmers who are able to achieve a higher return (Thobani, 1997). In a well-
functioning water market, water will have an opportunity cost so both buyers and sellers are
expected to adopt water conservation technologies although buyers may be more frugal as the
opportunity cost they face may be slightly higher due to transaction cost. No international
study offactors associated with buyers or sellers of water could be found, probably because
water markets need no justification in a country such as the USA where they have been
operating for more than a century.
4.1.1 Economic efficiency hypothesis
The economic efficiency hypothesis for a well-functioning water market is tested in the first
model that attempts to identify the characteristics that distinguish between buyers and sellers
ofwater use rights to determine the types ofusers and uses that water is transferring between.
This will indicate the types of users from which and to which water is transferring. From
this, conclusions can be drawn as to whether water is moving from relatively less efficient
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users to relatively more efficient users and hence whether the market promotes efficiency. In
addition, if water is transferring from small to large farms, this may indicate that the market
does not promote equity in allocation, or, conversely, may show a lack of evidence
supporting the notion that a market does little to promote efficiency. The economic
efficiency hypothesis is that the buyer of water has a high expected return per unit of water
(grows lucrative export crops), is more liquid (cash-flow), has a less negative view of the
five-year license review period and uses more advanced irrigation technology. Where
irregular river flow is a problem, then other considerations such as lower production risk,
lower financial risk and better cash flow may be more important.
4.1.2 Factors affecting future investment in irrigation farming
A second objective of the study was to measure the impact ofcertain economic variables on
future investment in irrigation farming. It was hypothesised that future investment will
depend on expected income, risk, risk aversion and liquidity. For more on factors that may
be considered in an investment model the reader is referred to Landsburg (1992). This
objective was achieved in the second economic model, which identified important factors
affecting farmers' investment decisions. Included in these factors is the relatively short
license review period. The model will estimate if this is a concern among the farmers and
whether it will affect their future investment. The model will highlight factors that stifle
investment and allow policy makers to identify what conditions to improve for increased
investment in irrigation. Increased investment in irrigation may not necessarily increase the
demand for water but may increase the efficiency with which it is used, and more efficient
users are able to access more water by purchasing it from less efficient users through the
market.
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4.1.3 Other research objectives
In addition to the empirical models estimated, additional information will be gathered from
the farmers regarding other important issues such as inter-basin water transfers, return flows
and transaction costs. Problems experienced in practice may be different to expectations.
Also, solutions to some ofthese problems may become apparent in practice because farmers
are forced to deal with them. For these reasons, it is expected that information collected from
farmers may be useful to further studies in this field.
This study is intended to add to the current literature on water markets. It builds on a
previous study by Armitage (1999), and uses additional techniques such as logit and probit
analysis, and also attempts to include the effects offarmers' risk preferences on water trading
decisions. In addition, the study will investigate farmers' perceptions on certain aspects of
the NWA. The models estimated by the dissertation will provide insightful information
regarding the efficiency of local water markets, the effects of risk preferences on market
behaviour, and uncertainty towards the security of water rights within the framework of the
NWA.
It is clear from the literature that water resources need to be used more efficiently. In
addition there are other necessary objectives that must be met. These include equity in water
allocation, and sustainable use. A well-functioning market requires a number of necessary
conditions to facilitate trading. Firstly, a market requires well-defined property rights. This
reduces uncertainty in the market and participants can trade with clear knowledge ofwhat the
right to the water prohibits them from doing or allows them to do with the water. The
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physical and legal framework within which the market operates is also important for a
successful water market. It must be physically possible for participants to transfer water
corresponding to the traded rights, and also the law must support trades and enable
enforcement of the legislation surrounding the trading process. In addition, the law is
important in defining the property rights to water.
4.2 Statistical procedures
Special attention is given in this section to the theoretical measurement of risk as it affects
the decision-making of water traders. Econometric procedures used in the study are also
discussed in this chapter.
4.2.1 Risk and risk aversion
It is hypothesised that investment decisions are influenced by the risk behaviour of the
individual. This is especially true in a situation ofhigh risk as is experienced in the SA study
areas arising from marketing risk. irrigation water availability, production risk. and policy
changes amongst others. The risk aversion offarmers included in the survey was measured
using the Arrow/Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient. The Arrow/Pratt absolute risk
aversion is defined as -U"(x)/U'(x) where U"(x) and U'(x) are the second and first
derivative of a von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function, U(x). In the study the negative
exponential utility function, U(x)=-exp{ -Ax} is assumed for simplicity as it has a constant
Arrow/Pratt coefficient (A). TIllS utility function is estimated by asking farmers two questions
relating to a hypothetical situation where they were faced with two options in each question.
In both questions, the farmer had to choose between an amount dependent on the results ofa
coin toss, and another amount with certainty. The certain amount was then adjusted until a
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level was reached where the farmer was indifferent between the two choices. A farmer is
risk neutral if the certain amount selected equalled the expected income of the coin toss
gamble. For the first question, the gamble was an equal probability of earning Rl 000 000
(xma\) and zero (Xmin) (p=0.5), with an expected income ofR500 000. The second question
gamble was an equal probability ofearning R800 000 and losing R200 000 (p=0.5), with an
expected income of R300 000. These amounts were chosen to resemble turnover amounts
that may occur in the local farming operations managed by the study farmers.
Although the Arrow/Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient has been extensively quoted in
literature, it has a major weakness in that it cannot be compared between different studies as
the coefficient depends on the scale and range of the data. Nieuwoudt and Hoag (1993)
suggested that the coefficient be standardised, a procedure followed by Ferrer (1999) and
also adopted in this dissertation. Standardisation was undertaken by converting the
distribution (Xmin:S x:S xma·J into a distribution (O:S x*:s l) where Xmin and xma'( are the
minimum and maximum values on the x-scale. This provides a unit-less expression of the
absolute risk aversion function. The algebraic derivation below shows the sensitivity 00. to
changes in the scale (whether data are expressed in Rands or Dollars) or range of data.
Let
*:. x = Xmin + X (xmax - Xmin)
where U(x) = _e-h and U(x*) = _e-A.*x*
.'. 'A*= 'A(Xmax - Xmin) since 'Axmin = constant.
(1)




Ridge Regression (RR) allows biased estimation ofthe regression coefficients by modifying
the method ofleast squares to remedy a multicollinearity problem. Ifan estimator has only a
small bias and is more precise than an unbiased estimator, it may well be the preferred
estimator, since it will have a larger probability ofbeing close to the true parameter (Neter et
at., 1996:411; Maddala, 1992). The ridge standardised regression estimators are obtained by
introducing into the least squares normal equations a biasing constant K 2: 0 where K usually
varies between 0 and 1. Following Neter et al. (1996:412), the ridge trace and the Variance
Inflation Factors (VIFs) were used to determine the optimum value of K. This is done by
choosing the smallest value ofK where the regression coefficients first become stable in the
ridge trace.
4.2.3 Principal component analysis
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a multivariate transformation technique with which a
set ofcomplex relations can be reduced to a simple canonical form. The purpose ofPCA can
also be described as an effort to economize on the number of variables (Jolliffe, 1986).
Principal components are obtained by linear transformations of the observed variables as
follows:
(2)
where XI, X2 ... X p are the original variables; the aip are the component loadings such that
ai/ + ail + ... + ai/ = unity or the eigenvalue for PC i (i.e., normalization). In doing so, PC I ,
the first principal component, makes the greatest contribution to the variance as contained in
the p original variables; the second, PC2 is chosen to be uncorrelated with the first, and to
have as large a variance as possible, etc. The X variates are thus transformed using the
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correlation matrix (where variables are measured in widely differing units) to new
uncorrelated variates, which account for as much variation as possible in descending order
(Nieuwoudt, 1977:78). The number of PCs retained also depends upon whether or not the
estimated PCs can be meaningfully interpreted.
4.2.4 Logistic regression
This model uses logit analysis to assess factors that influence a farmer's decision to be a
buyer or a seller in the water market. IfBuyers are coded 1 and Sellers are coded 0, then the
probability that a participant is a buyer (Pi) can be represented by:
1
P = E(Y = 11 X ) = -
/ / 1+e-Zj
(3)
where Z i = j30 + j3n X ni and the Xn are n variables hypothesised to explain why water is
bought or sold.
This equation (3) represents the (cumulative) logistic distribution function. As Zi ranges
from -00 to +00, Pi ranges from °to 1. In addition, Pi is nonlinearly related toX. However Pi
is also nonlinearly related to the f3 's, and the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure
cannot be used to estimate the parameters (Gujarati, 1995:554). The probability of the /h
participant being a seller is (l-P i), while P)(l-PD is known as the odds ratio in favour of the
participant being a buyer in the market. The natural log ofPi /(l-PD is:
L, =l{1~P, ] ~ Z, ~ 130 + fJ,X" + ... + fJ"X", (4)
Now L, the log of the odds ratio, or logit, is linear in X and, more importantly, in the
parameters. However to estimate this model, the values ofthe logit (L i) must be known. For
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(5)
estimation purposes, (4) is written as:
L, ~ 1n[I~P, ] = /30 + /3,X" + ... + /3"X", + p,
For data on individual participants, the logits are meaningless, as:
L i = In[1/0] if the i
1h participant is a buyer, and
L i = In[O/l] if the i
th participant is a seller.
In this case, the maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the parameters (Gujarati,
1995: 556). A key advantage of the maximum likelihood method is that it does not require
the restrictive normality assumption about the distribution of the independent variables in
order to make inferences about the estimated model parameters.
The model analyses permanent trades of water entitlements in the water market, since no
temporary trades occurred amongst the survey farmers. The main aim of the model is to
identify the important factors that contributed to the farmers' decision to either buy or sell
water in the market. The farmer type - Buyer or Seller - is hypothesised to be determined by
the n attributes (Xs) of the farm business and the farmer. The dependent variable in the
analysis (TYPE) was coded using one (1) for farmers who had purchased water entitlements,
and zero (0) for farmers who had sold water entitlements within the past five years.
4.3 The study areas
The first section of this chapter discusses the areas studied, which describes the geographic
location of the area, brief climatological information, and information regarding the water
resources of the area. The second section specifies and discusses hypothetical economic
models that will be tested with data collected from the study areas.
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4.3.1 The Lower Orange River
The Orange River, South Africa's major river, rises in the Drakensberg in Lesotho, where it is
known as the Senqu. The river flows westward for some 2200km ending up in the Atlantic
Ocean at Alexander Bay. At the source of the Orange River the rainfall is approximately
2000mm per annum and the rainfall levels decrease as the river flows westward. At its
mouth the rainfall is less than 50mm per annum. Evaporation, on the other hand, increases in
a westerly direction. The study was conducted among irrigation farmers in the Boegoeberg
and Kakamas Irrigation Schemes along the Orange River in the Northern Cape Province
during October 2003. These areas are roughly 120km Southeast and 95km Southwest of
Upington respectively. Figure 4.1 overleaf shows the location ofBoegoeberg and Kakamas
along the Lower Orange River, where the study was undertaken (Water Management Area
14). The climate over the Lower Orange region is harsh and semi-desert, with minimum
rainfall ranging from 400mm to 50mm per year. This area is totally dependent on the flow of
water in the Orange River (RSA. 2002). The largest primary contributors to the economy are
made by mining and irrigated agriculture. With over 90 percent of water use in the Water
Management Area (WMA) being for irrigation, most attention is given to the continuous
improvement of irrigation practices and maximisation ofthe benefits derived. The tendency
for irrigation agriculture has been towards the growing of high value orchard crops and
export grapes.
The target population ofwater buyers and sellers was identified using records obtained from
the Department ofWater Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) head office in Pretoria and consisted
offarmers who had transferred water entitlements between January 1998 and August 2003.
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A census survey was attempted, although not all farmers were available to be interviewed
and not all the farmers' phone numbers were available. An effort was made to personally








An extensive canal irrigation system exists along the Lower Orange River. Farms usually
stretch from the riverbanks to land beyond the canal, which divides them into "inner land"
and "outer land". "Inner land" is arable land situated between the river and the canal and is
coupled to a canal water right. The lowest cost method (but not necessarily most efficient
method) of irrigation for this land is usually flood irrigation, unless the land is unusually
steep. "Outer land" is land situated on the inland side ofthe canal and requires an alternative
form of irrigation if the land is to be developed. Originally, water rights stemmed from the
riparian rights doctrine, where riparian land which must be situated within a distance of2000
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metres from the banks of the river, and within a height if60 metres vertically above the river
bank. The maximum area allocated to each property was 30 hectares of canal water rights,
which could be used to irrigate "inner land". If a property had an irrigable "inner land" area
smaller than 30 hectares, then the difference between the 30 hectares and the "inner land"
size was allocated to the "outer land" as a river water right. The maximum quantity of water
that a right provided annually was determined to be 15 000m3 ofwater per hectare. After the
completion ofthe Verwoerd dam in 1997, now known as the Gariep dam, farmers were given
the opportunity to buy additional rights over and above their initial allocation. The
completion of this darn also allowed regulation of the flow of water below the dam, which
provided water users with more consistent access to water. The canals have historically been
operated and maintained by the DWAF, but these activities have recently been handed over
to the newly formed Water User Association (WUA). The WUA allows farmers to
participate in the maintenance duties in order to reduce their levies.
4.3.2 The Crocodile River Catchment
The Inkomati Water Management Area is situated in the north-eastern part ofSouth Africa in
the Mpumalanga Province and borders on Mozambique and Swaziland. Topographically, the
Great Escarpment (referred to as the gorge section of the river) divides this area into a
western plateau and sub-tropical Lowveld in the east. Rainfall varies from 400rnm to over
1200rnn1 per year in the mountains (RSA, 2002). The study was undertaken amongst
irrigation farmers along the Crocodile River above the gorge, and below the gorge towards
Komatipoort during November 2003 with additional interviews conducted in March 2004.
The climate in the study area varies from warm subtropical at Nelspruit, above the gorge, to
hot subtropical downstream from the gorge. The area below the gorge falls within the
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Nkomazi/Onderberg region ofMpumalanga an area that has been thoroughly researched in
recent times (NOWAC, 1999). The NOWAC (1999) study reports the following hectares
planted under irrigation: bananas (4400), citrus (6000), litchis (330), mangoes (1150), papaya
(700), sugar cane (34 000), and vegetables (200). This area produces more than 50 percent of
South Africa's banana crop. Figure 4.2 shows the location of irrigation farmers surveyed
along the Crocodile River from Schagen (west ofNelspruit) through to Komatipoort (near the
border with Mozambique). For an additional map that also shows the major roads, please see





Figure 4.2: Map of the Inkomati Water Management Area.
The target population was identified using documents supplied by the Department ofWater
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Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), which record the names of buyers and sellers of water
entitlements from 1998 to 2003. Phone numbers were then obtained from the Malelane
Inigation Board and from Transvaal Suiker Beperk. Very few water market transactions had
occuned, with many records indicating land transfers (with the coinciding water entitlement),
and internal transfers of water!. Many sellers were unavailable, as they had retired and/or
moved away. An effort was made to interview as many farmers appearing on the list as
possible, and some respondents were neither buyer nor seller - contrary to the list. These
cases are possibly internal transfers between different organisational structures with the same
owner - such as a company or trust.
The study was undertaken in the same area and possibly on the same farms visited by Bate et
al. (1999) in order to study dynamic features of the market. A list of farm names visited in
the earlier study was available that aided selection. This information was, however, vague
and it was often not possible to locate the same farmer as interviewed before. Bate et al.
(1999) reported few buyers, with four ofthem accounting for 90 percent ofthe trade volume.
In the present study, six buyers were visited that collectively farm on 85 percent of the
inigated area under the gorge, so the author is confident that the buyers in the earlier study
were included. Putter (2004) estimates that about 16000 hectares are under irrigation below
the gorge along the Crocodile River.
Sellers in the earlier study were from the Schagen, Cairn, and Alkrnaar areas. These areas
were revisited and similar, and possibly the same, farmers were interviewed (the location of
these areas is above Nelspruit). Holtzhauzen (2004), a former professor in horticultural
I Transfers between different portions of land owned by the same farmer
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science who farms abovethe gorge, is ofthe opinion that water from tributaries that flow into
the Crocodile River will enter the market in future. He is at present facilitating such a case.
It is puzzling that while there is concern about low dam levels and shortages of water that
new still unused water may enter the market, which will further aggravate water shortages
during dry periods. An opinion is that the Kwena dam has a limited catchment and that it is
too high up the river. Holzthauzen (2004) further suggested that another dam at a more
appropriate location is the only solution. The issue is then whether farmers will be prepared
to pay the full recovery cost of such a dam.
The following chapter discusses the survey results for the Lower Orange River region. The
characteristics of the surveyed farmers (Buyers and Sellers) are described. Price trends for
water market transactions are also presented. This is followed by a discussion ofthe farmers'
collective opinions regarding certain aspects of the NWA.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE LOWER ORANGE RIVER SURVEY
This chapter analyses and discusses various characteristics of farmers in the Lower Orange
River area. Farmers are grouped as either buyers or sellers depending on whether they bought
or sold water entitlements in the market.
5.1 Characteristics of water Buyers and Sellers
Thirty-seven farmers were interviewed, of which four questionnaires were unusable as the
transfer of water was linked to the transfer of land and therefore was not a water market
transaction. Ofthe 33 remaining farmers, 13 were solely Buyers and 18 were solely Sellers
in the water market. Two farmers could not be classified as Buyer or Seller, since they had
both purchased and sold water. These farmers were included in the analysis as both Buyer
and Seller bringing the total for Buyers to 15 and Sellers to 20. Table 5.1 summarises the
average available irrigation land and average water entitlements held by surveyed farmers,
and shows that most of these farmers - whether buyers or sellers - held more water
entitlements than their actual irrigated area. The typical motive was that additional water
was held for future expansion of enterprises.
Table 5.1: Average irrigation land area and water entitlements of survey farmers in the
Lower Orange River Region, October 2003.
Average available Average actual Average water
irrigation land irrigated area entitlements held
Buyers (n=15) 221.8 ha 97.2 ha 137.7 ha
Sellers (n=20) 84.8 ha 59.8 ha 73.0 ha
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Sellers had, on average, about 22 percent more hectares of water entitlements than actual
area planted, whereas Buyers had 41 percent more hectares of water entitlements. This is
probably because Buyers purchase water entitlements from Sellers and are in the process of
developing new land. Buyers have used, on average, only 43 percent of their available
irrigation land, compared with Sellers who have used 70 percent. This means that Buyers on
average have more additional irrigation land available than Sellers and this could be a reason
for purchasing additional entitlements. This is consistent with Armitage's (1999) findings.
A summary ofthe cropping enterprises operated by survey farmers is presented in Table 5.2.
None of the survey farmers produced dryland crops. The table shows the total land use of
all surveyed farmers.
Table 5.2: Irrigated land use by survey farmers in the Lower Orange River Region, October
2003.
1 - Wme, JUIce and/or ralsm grapes
2 - Citrus, pecan nuts, mangoes, and melons
3 - Lucerne, cotton, maize, and wheat
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentage land use.
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Export (Table) Other Horticultural Field Total
Grapes Grapes l Crops2 Crops3
Buyers 930.8 ha 404.6 ha 106.3 ha 12.8 ha 1454.5 ha
(n=15) (64.0 %) (27.8 %) (7.3 %) (0.9 %) (100 %)
Sellers 167.4 ha 633.6 ha 22 ha 373.4 ha 1196.4 ha
(n=2O) (14.0 %) (53 %) (1.8 %) (31.2 %) (100 %)
Total 1098.2 ha 1038.2 ha 128.3 ha 386.2 ha 2650.9 ha
(n=35) (41.4 %) (39.2 %) (4.8 %) (14.6 %) (100 %)
.. ..
About 64 percent of Buyers' land is used for export (table) grape production while only 14
percent ofSellers' land is used for this enterprise. The Sellers have a larger area (53 percent)
under wine, juice, and raisin grapes than Buyers (28 percent). This feature was also
observed in the earlier study by Armitage (1999). In total, 80 percent of the respondents'
land is used for grape production. A much higher percentage of Sellers' land is devoted to
field crops (31 percent) compared with Buyers' land under field crops (1 percent). There is a
small difference in the area of horticultural crops between Buyers and Sellers. Four Buyers
grew citrus and melons whilst one Seller grew pecan nuts.
Scores, indicating the degree of crop diversification by survey farmers were estimated for
Buyers and Sellers using the Herfindahl index, which is calculated as follows (Pope and
Prescott, 1980):
Herfindahl index = I Pi 2 (6)
where Pi = N
" AL..i=) I
Ai = crop acreage of activity i
I:I Ai = total farm acreage cropped.
(7)
The scores are obtained by summing the square of the proportion of each crop grown. A
score of 1 means complete specialization, while a score closer to zero shows high crop
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diversification. Buyers had slightly less crop diversification (0.5119) than Sellers (0.4232),
which implies that Buyers are more exposed to market sources of risk than Sellers.
The types of irrigation systems used by survey farmers shown in Table 5.3 consist of drip,
micro and flood irrigation systems, while two farmers utilise macro systems. Buyers make
more use of advanced irrigation systems (drip and micro), with almost 70 percent of their
crops irrigated by either of these systems. A reason for this is that Buyers often develop
additional 'outer' land, which cannot be irrigated using flood irrigation.
Table 5.3: Irrigation systems used by survey farmers in the Lower Orange River Region,
October 2003.
Drip Micro Flood Macro] Total
Buyers 607.9 ha 390.1 ha 456.7 ha oha 1209.7 ha
(0=15) (41.8 %) (26.8 %) (31.4 %) (0 %) (lOO %)
Sellers 60.4 ha 128.5 ha 1123.2 ha 6 ha 1073.1 ha
(0=20) (4.6 %) (9.7 %) (85.2 %) (0.6 %) (lOO %)
Total 668.3 ha 518.6 ha 1579.9 ha 6 ha 2772.8 ha
(0=35) (24.1 %) (l8.7 %) (57.0 %) (0.2 %) (lOO %)
1) Overhead spnnklers
Note: Figures in parentheses represent irrigation use percentages.
Few Sellers use advanced irrigation, and seem to use mostly flood irrigation (85 percent)
(some laser levelled flood lands). Sellers usually have less land available for further
development, or find it infeasible to develop their'outer' land, which are often reasons for
selling their additional water use entitlements.
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5.2 Trends in water prices in the Lower Orange River Region (1998 - 2003)
A total of 49 water-trading transactions occurred for the period 1998 to 2003 amongst
farmers surveyed2. Although the study was undertaken in 2003, the farmers were asked for
details of transactions that occurred within this five-year period. All transactions were
permanent, and no temporary trades had taken place amongst surveyed farmers. Farmers
were ofthe opinion that no temporary trades had taken place due to the relatively stable river
level- continually high degree ofassurance ofsupply - and the need for long-term rights to
water. Two transactions were excluded from the price analysis, as one was water traded for
land, and in the other transaction, the farmer could not remember the price of the transaction.
Table 5.4 overleaf summarises the transactions that took place, while the trend in real water
prices is shown in Figure 5.1 overleaf. The amount of purchases and sales are not equal
because water was traded with farmers who were not in the surveyed areas. Water prices in
real terms fluctuated from year to year, presumably in accordance with market conditions of
demand and supply of water. There are two measures ofprice; one is a simple average ofthe
transaction price, and the other is a weighted average of prices. The weighted average is
measured by calculating the sum ofthe total price paid for each transaction and weighted by
the total area transacted.
2 One farmer stated that the trade referred to in the DWAF records for 1998 actually occurred in 1997. The
approval date of the transaction was in 1998. This was consequently used as a 1998 transaction.
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Table 5.4: Real trading prices of water in the Lower Orange River, 1997 to October 2003.
Year Purch- Sales Avg Average Std Minimum Maximum Average CV
ases' I size Transaction Dev2 Transaction Transaction Price/ha' (%)'
(ha) Price/ha (R) Price/ha (R) Price/ha (R) (R)
1997~ 9 21 55.5 R4929 - Rl157 R7233 R4888 -
1998 4 6 45.1 R6327 R3222 R4064 RI3548 R5839 50.9
1999 5 I 8.6 R9801 R2106 R7726 R12877 R10404 21.5
2000 7 8 12.5 R11552 R2131 R5499 RI4053 R10425 18.4
2001 5 3 15.6 RI0333 Rl397 R9249 R12717 RIOlOJ 13.5
2002 4 I I J R9276 RI455 R7201 RI0589 R9424 15.7
2003 0 2 16.8 R14000 R5657 RI0000 R18000 R16328 40.4
I - These columns represent number of purchases and sales recorded
2 - Standard deviation
3 - Weighted Average - weighted by area transferred
4 - Coefficient of Variation (CV) = standard deviation divided by mean (Spiegel, 1961 :73)
5 - Data from Armitage (1999) for years 1994 to 1997
ote: All prices are in real (2003 rand) tenns (using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2003=100, source: StatsSA).
16000
n:s 14000
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Figure 5.1: Trends in real water prices (2003 Rands) in the Lower Orange River Area, 1997
to 2003 (Average transaction price (Rlha)).
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The average size of transactions was 21.19 hectares of water entitlements (or 328500m\
The average transaction price per hectare of water (15000m
3
) for the period was R9882 in
2003 rands, which is RO.66 per cubic meter. This is the sum ofthe per hectare price for each
transaction divided by the number of transactions, and not a weighted average. The total
value for all water transacted was R8 906020for 1038.1 hectares ofwater entitlements, which
is a weighted average price of R8579 per hectare or RO.57 per cubic meter. The average
transaction price per hectare recorded by Armitage (1999) for the period 1994 to 1997 was
R4929 per hectare, and the weighted average was R4888 per hectare (or RO.33 per cubic
meter) in terms of2003 rands. This is substantially lower than prices indicated in Table 5.4
(columns 5 and 9) for the subsequent period. The average price ofwater per hectare for 1998
was relatively low compared with the years from 1999 through to 2003. The price was fairly
stable during 1999 to 2002 with a large increase in 2003. The 2003 figure is likely to be an
inaccurate representation ofthe true market price since only two transactions were recorded.
One possible reason for the increased price per transaction from 1997 to 2000 is that supply
has become more inelastic due to a reduced supply of unused water entitlements as many
unused entitlements have been sold. Most farmers who sold water use entitlements were not
using the water and would not have been using it in future due to perceived, relatively high
costs of developing 'outer' land. Many farmers considering trading water consulted the
DWAF offices in Upington for information regarding available water entitlements. Potential
Buyers occasionally use DWAF records to identify farmers with excess unused water
entitlements. In addition, farmers intending to sell water inform the DWAF office of their
intention (Steenkamp, 2003). In this way, much of the unused allocations have been
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reallocated, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to find available unused water use
entitlements for sale, which has affected the price as competing Buyers vie for fewer
available entitlements (more inelastic supply).
The demand for water is a derived demand, derived from the demand for the product, the
production function and supply conditions of other factors. The implication is that water
prices will increase if expected product prices, and hence profits, increase, especially if
supply is relatively inelastic. Table grape export prices are sensitive to the rand exchange
rate. The Rand weakened against major currencies during the period studied, which most
likely caused an increase in the price of exported grapes. The strengthening of the Rand
exchange rate during 2003 to 2004 has, according to several farmers in the region, severely
affected profits from export table grapes and it is expected that real water prices will fall
agam.
Information about the prices of water use entitlements is not freely available, as DWAF
offices do not keep records of prices of previous transactions since the agreement for
compensation is between farmers. There is also no central notice board that farmers can
consult in this regard. Farmers ascertain prices for water use entitlements by 'word of
mouth'. This could partly explain why there is such a large range in the price per hectare for
transactions. The coefficient ofvariation (standard deviation/mean) in water prices appears
to have declined from 1998 to 2003 (Table 5.4 last column), which would be expected if
more information becomes available. The source ofadditional information in this case could
be from the DWAF regional office.
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It is difficult to identify temporary transactions in the Lower Orange River water market
since most are informal arrangements between farmers along a single section ofa canal, and
no records are kept of these trades. According to some farmers, few temporary transactions
take place because farmers need the long-term security of having water available for
perennial crops and prefer covering this need with permanent rights. Many farmers also have
more permanent entitlements than water used at present. These excess water entitlements are
usually for future enterprise development, and not necessarily for insurance against a lack of
water. Water has been readily available over the last ten years, which respondents attribute
to the Vanderkloof dam, which has stabilised the flow of water in the river.
5.3 Arrow/Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient
The risk profile of the respondents was estimated using the Arrow/Pratt Absolute Risk
Aversion (APARA) Coefficient, which is estimated by asking the farmer specifically
formulated questions. The first risk question estimates the risk aversion ofthe farmer where
no unfavourable outcome (loss) is allowed (excludes downside risk). The median APARA
coefficient for Buyers was 2.44 (n=14) and for Sellers 2.12 (n=20). A positive coefficient
implies that farmers are risk averse. The minimum and maximum values for both Buyers and
Sellers were -1.18 and 69.28 (n=14). The minimum value was for the farmer who bought
and sold water and was classified as both Buyer and Seller. The maximum values for each
category were from two different farmers. Three Buyers were risk neutral, and two were risk
preferring. One Seller was risk neutral and one was risk preferring. This indicates that the
farmers were, on average, risk averse, with Buyers being slightly more risk averse than
Sellers. In the second scenario, farmers are faced with downside risk where there is a chance
that they can lose money if they select the uncertain alternative. Farmers are more risk
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averse (downside risk) than anticipated in the questionnaire as almost all of the farmers
picked the most risk averse category. That is, they did not pick a choice where money could
be lost.
The median APARA coefficient for both Buyers (n=14) and Sellers (n=20) calculated as 3.28
is thus an underestimate. In a choice situation an estimate of 3.28 implies indifference
between a certain income of RO and being given a 50% chance on winning R800 000 and
losing R200 000. The mean of this gamble is R300 000 which is a significant reward for
taking a risk. All but one of the Sellers and 57 percent ofthe Buyers would rather not receive
any amount in order to avoid the possibility of a loss. Faced with downside risk, farmers are
more risk averse than when downside risk is excluded (3.28 exceeds 2.44 and 2.12). The
effects of risk on investment in ilTigation will be analysed in an investment model. The
downside APARA coefficient was not used in the regression models due to lack ofvariability
in the APARA coefficient scores.
5.4 Further analysis of farmer responses
The responses of farmers regarding questions on their opinions about the NWA, and their
perceptions regarding the five-year license review period are discussed in this section. Other
responses gathered from the questionnaires are also analysed.
5.4.1 Farmers' perceptions of the NWA
Respondents were asked to rank specific questions pertaining to the NWA on a five-category
scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. The statements and the farmers'
responses are presented in Table 5.5 overleaf. The responses are categorised as: SA _
'Strongly Agee'; A - 'Agree'; U - 'Uncertain'; D - 'Disagree'; and SD - 'Strongly
Disagree'. The responses were also classified according to Buyers and Sellers to identify any
-54-
anomalies. The total (33) reflects two fewer observations than the total ofBuyers and Sellers
(35) since two farmers were classified as both Buyer and Seller, but were included only once
for the total.
'My opinion of the New Water Act has become more posItIve sInce the Act was
first published'.
2 'The New Water Act provides increased protection for the environment, which
sets it apart from the old Act'.
3 'The New Water Act has made the trading of water use rights (licenses) a simpler
process' .
Table 5.5: Summary of farmers' responses to statements made regarding the NWA,
Lower Orange River Area 2003,
Statement Trade Type
Category Total = n
SA A U D SD
1 Buyer 2 6 4 2 1 15
Seller 1 5 7 5 2 20
Total 2 11 11 6 3 33
2 Buver 2 9 2 2 0 15
Seller 2 6 6 4 2 20
Total
,.,
14 8 6 2 33:)
3 Buyer 1 1 9 4 0 15
Seller 0 5 10 4 1 20
Total 1 6 17 8 1 33
..
Results show that there is a lot of uncertainty amongst the sample farmers regarding the
NWA. Farmers interviewed admitted that they had little knowledge ofspecific details ofthe
Act, which is reflected by Table 5.5. Responses are evenly distributed around the
'Uncertain' option, while Buyers and Sellers differ regarding the first two statements.
Buyers have become more positive about the NWA since it was first published, with 53
percent of responses in agreement with the statement, compared with only 30 percent of
Sellers in agreement. Similarly, Buyers feel the Act provides increased protection for the
environment (73 percent in agreement) compared with Sellers (40 percent in agreement).
The totals for each of the first two statements also reflect more responses in agreement with
the statements than in disagreement. However, there is much uncertainty surrounding the
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respondents' opinions of the Act, suggesting that more needs to be done to supply relevant
information to the farmers, especially about the practical implications of the Act, and
necessarily at a level of detail that can easily be understood by the non-technical reader.
Responses to the third statement about transfers of water reveal that farmers have
experienced no increased administrative burden in the trading process. All traded water must
result in a conversion to a water licence (Steenkamp, 2003). The Buyer must apply for a
licence for the trade to occur. Farmers stated that although the administrative burden of
trading ofwater is fairly substantial, they had much assistance from the relevant personnel at
the DWAF offices in Upington. This support function provided by the regional DWAF
office is vital to reducing the transaction costs (including risk), but approval from the Head
Office is required and increases the time span of the transaction (Steenkamp, 2003).
5.4.2 Farmers' perception of the five-year review period
Farmers were also asked to rate (on a scale from 0 to 100) the importance of the five-year
review of licenses as a factor affecting their investment decisions (REVIEW in Table 5.6
overleaf). Ratings close to lOO indicated that the review period would be a major factor, and
zero indicated no effect. Similarly, farmers were asked to rate (on a scale from 0 to lOO)
what effect the five-year review period would have on the security of water licenses
(INSECURE in Table 5.6). Ratings of 100 indicate a high degree ofuncertainty surrounding
water licenses, and zero indicates that licences are secure. Table 5.6 shows, as was the case
in Table 5.5, that the total reflects two less observations than the total ofBuyers and Sellers
as two farmers were classified as both Buyer and Seller.
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[Type 0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100
Buyer 3 0 2 2 8 15
Review Seller 6 0 5 3 5 19
rrOTAL 8 0 6 5 13 32
Buyer 2 0 3 2 7 14
Insecure Seller 4 1 5 3 6 19
rrOTAL 5 1 7 5 13 31
Both Buyers and Sellers tend to rank REVIEW and INSECURE on the higher end of the
scale. This implies that many farmers feel that the five-year review period will affect their
investment decisions, and that the review period affects the perceived security of licenses.
This is likely explained by the planning horizon for many of the crops grown in the area,
such as vineyard and orchards crops, exceeding five years and farmers' need for assurance of
water supply for the lifespan of the crop. In fact, farmers' require security of water
entitlements for as long as they run the farming business. The respondents were also unsure
as to what would be subject to review. and whether or not any water entitlements held in
excess ofplanted area would be lost due to non-use at review, which could be an additional
reason for the absence of a formal temporary entitlement market. The lack of clear
information about the review process affects farmers' irrigation investment decisions and the
security of the water licenses. The practical implications of the review period should be
made clear to farmers as it may be hampering plans to further invest in and develop in the
area.
5.4.3 Farmers' reasons for sale/purchase of water
The main motivation for selling water was the large distances that water needed to be
pumped to reach their land, the cost ofdeveloping 'virgin' land, and the rugged terrain that
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some farmers are faced with. It was not economically feasible for sellers to develop 'outer'
land, while some stated that the land is not suitable for irrigation. Even if such land was
suitable for irrigation then export crops such as table grapes cannot be grown. Some Sellers
stated that they have more water entitlements than land, while others identified financial
constraints. Financial constraints are not expected to be a factor in the long run since in this
case farmers with more capital will likely move into the area. Most sellers stated that they
were not using the water, and feared losing the water entitlement ifthey continued their non-
use. Buyers tended to use the water to expand development on their farms, with the primary
expansion focus in table grape production for export while some mentioned citrus. Some
buyers stated that they were in the process of expanding development and had water
entitlements exceeding their current water use.
5.4.4 Transaction costs of water sales
Transaction costs can be divided into fixed cost (search cost) and variable cost components,
while a distinction could be made between actual and subjective costs (opportunity cost of
time). The opportunity cost of time, for trading in water entitlements, appears to be small.
The time span ofmost sales is from one week to three months, which is very short for a sale.
This period is short as consent is required only from DWAF. The potential transaction costs
arising from disputes and litigation due to negative externalities are usually very low amongst
the respondents. The above period can be compared to the transfer time ofwater sales in the
Northem Colorado Water Conservancy District oftwo to three months which is considered a
very short period (Nieuwoudt, 2000).
Actual transaction costs reported by farmers vary markedly from farm to farm. Sellers
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indicate that buyers are responsible for the cost of the transfer, while most buyers either
indicate no cost or they could not remember any cost. Costs depend on whether an agent is
used to assist in the transaction or whether a legal person is involved. The cost of an agent
(or legal person) could be about 1.5% to 3% ofthe total sale price. Many mentioned that a
plough certificate is required, while one farmer reported land survey costs and another
environmental assessment costs.
In most cases DWAF was the main source of information for trading, so this was not an
actual cost to the parties apart from the time spent at the DWAF offices and travelling costs.
Other sources of information are by word of mouth, the DWAF website and local
newspapers. However, there are great differences between minimum and maximum selling
prices, which indicate a lack of information on trade prices. The impression is that farmers
need simplified and practical information. The market also appears thin (few trades) which
increases search cost. Fixed transaction costs (search cost) are reduced if a buyer (seller)
trades with many other parties. One buyer had five transactions with two sellers, which must
have reduced the cost of information between parties. Olmstead (1998) explained that
repeated trading between the same parties in the Westlands Water District in California was
due to the high fixed transaction cost. In the Lower Orange it was more common for a large
buyer to contract with different sellers. For instance one buyer had seven transactions with
six sellers. This could also lead to asymmetric information where buyers know more about
water prices than sellers. In summary, transaction costs appear low in most cases, as
approval is only needed from DWAF (no disputes and litigation), while transaction time is
short (opportunity cost of time low). Although DWAF provides a clearinghouse for sales,
the impression is that there is generally a lack of information about water trading
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opportunities (infOlmation is relatively costly).
5.4.5 Water conservation practices
Some buyers indicated that they have always used drip irrigation and conserved water this
way. One buyer indicated that water entitlements he saved by using water conservation
strategies, he uses to irrigate a larger area. He also uses conserved water entitlements for
security purposes. For instance water allocation is 15000 cubic meters per ha but by using
drip (arguably) only 7000 cubic meters per ha is used. According to another this practice is
not allowed, so there is uncertainty regarding what is permitted. The former farmer also
irrigates a small area under lucerne, which he uses as a water reserve for his table grapes.
Most sellers indicated no change in water conservation methods although some mentioned
levelling of flood lands. Some sellers indicated that water conserved in this way is used to
irrigate a larger area while others keep it for security purposes.
5.4.6 Externalities associated with irrigation practices
The irrigation of outer land could lead to a salinity build-up on inner land, implying that
externalities are not internalised if the owners of adjacent inner and outer land are not the
same person. All transfers have been from non-users to users, which mean that transfers will
reduce in-stream flow. Application of the NWA will prevent this if no surplus water is
available. Further, all transfers are also from higher up the river to down stream users. This
is the more desirable direction of transfer (in the Western USA, transfer from down to up-
stream is not permitted) as in-stream flow is reduced below the point where water is
withdrawn from the river. The transfer ofunused water from Boegoeberg to Kakamas means
that the transfer does not adversely affect employment and economic activity in the former
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area.
5.4.7 Total water market transactions in Boegoeberg and Kakamas
Table 5.7 shows the numbers of water trades that have been approved by DWAF in
Boegoeberg and Kakamas from 1998 to June 2003. Some of the transactions consist of the
sale ofmany small irrigation plots by the same farmer. Each plot is entered as an entry in the
register, explaining the large number of entries compared to transactions, especially in
Boegoeberg. The export ofwater from Boegoeberg was matched by imports from Kakarnas.
The number of transactions declined in Boegoeberg after 2001, while the area imported in
Kakamas also declined in that year. In both areas few trades were approved since 2002. The
large number of sales in 1998 and shortly afterwards gives the impression that sales were
motivated by perceptions that unused entitlements would be lost.
Table 5.7: Water market transactions, Boegoeberg and Kakarnas, 1998 to June 2003.
Boegoeberg Kakamas
Year Transactions Entries Hectares Transactions Entries Hectares
1998 40 165 -282.1 17 26 +596.5
1999 15 82 -151.8 24 33 +132.9
2000 32 74 -237.6 26 29 +235.2
2001 11 30 -140.6 30 37 +4.6
2002 3 7 -56.8 6 8 +32.3
2003 5 9 +7.9 0 0 0
Total 106 367 -861.0 103 133 +1001.5
Source. Ceromo (2003).
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During 1998 to June 2003, 861 ha ofwater entitlements were transferred out ofBoegoeberg.
The net sales of farmers in Boegoeberg included in the survey were 316.6 ha for the same
period. According to Table 5.7, Kakamas imported 1001.5 ha. The corresponding net
purchases by surveyed farmers were 480.3 ha. It appears as if farmers in the sample were
responsible for a considerable proportion of water traded in these areas.
The following chapter discusses the survey results for the Crocodile River region. The bio-
climatic conditions experienced in the areas within the catchment are discussed. Problems
with water transfers are highlighted and discussed as this market operated differently to that
in the Lower Orange River area. The characteristics of the surveyed farmers are described.
Price trends for water market transactions are presented and discussed. This is followed by a




THE CROCODILE RIVER SURVEY
This chapter discusses the growing conditions experienced in the Crocodile River Region and
analyses and discusses various characteristics of farmers in the region. Farmers are grouped
as either buyers or sellers depending on whether they bought or sold water entitlements in the
market.
6.1 Nature of water transfers
All but one of the trades (permanent and rent) observed in the Lower Crocodile River
occurred from farmers above the gorge to farmers below the gorge and all transfers were
from up- to down-stream. Only water that was not used was sold or rented out.
6.1.1 Bio-climatic conditions in areas trading in water
In a well-functioning water market it is expected that water w1ll move from less desirable
land to land where the return per unit of water (allowing for risk) is higher. It is thus
essential to understand the climatic conditions in this area in order to draw conclusions
regarding the desirable outcomes oftransfers ofwater. Holtzhauzen (2004) is ofthe opinion
that the reason why water moves from above the gorge to below is because of constraints
faced by farmers above the gorge such as financial and management. He believes that the
soils above the gorge can be improved artificially. If these were the only constraints on
horticultural production above the gorge then, from an economic point of view, one would
expect that new farmers who are financially stronger and better managers would move into
this area. This is not the case. Economic logic thus does not support the reasoning that the
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binding constraints above the gorge are financial and management, although these may play a
role.
Wolstenholme (2004) attributes the movement of water from above to below the gorge to
better growing conditions below. Wolstenholme (2004), a retired professor in horticultural
science, often consults in this area while he also grew up nearby (White River).
Wolstenholme's observations are strongly supported by Bower (2004), also a professor in
horticultural science, who for many years worked in this area (Nelspruit) as a horticulturalist.
All the information regarding growing conditions provided in this section is from
Wolstenholme (2004) unless another resource is referenced.
More specifically, the reasons for the relatively unfavourable growing conditions above the
gorge are the following. The soils above the gorge from Schagen down are sandy (low clay -
below 10 percent - and low organic matter content) which means that water and minerals
cannot be stored to any significant degree. Temperatures above the gorge are also not hot
enough for the heat loving crops under irrigation (sugar cane, mangoes, grape fruit,
Valencia's and bananas) while on the other hand it is not cool enough for temperate crops
that require coolness (pecans). The heat loving crops achieve greater yields below the gorge.
Under good husbandry (irrigation and fertilization), orcharding is possible above the gorge
but conditions are not as favourable as below. Downstream from the gorge, different soil
types occur but generally with a higher clay content. The best soils are the Basalt found near
Komatipoort. These soils are rich in calcium, potassium and magnesium.
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The suitability ofthe two areas to specific crops is instructive to an understanding why water
entitlements are transferred from up- to down-stream.
Citrus. Hall and Sons, a well-known citrus grower above the gorge has now pulled out all
their citrus trees. A reason is that the relatively cooler climate above the gorge coupled with
moist conditions leads to relatively high humidity levels in which the bacteria Citrus psylla
flourish. These bacteria cause greening in citrus. Fruit infected with this disease are small,
have a bitter taste, and cannot be exported or even sold locally (Bower, 2004). This disease
is also the reason why farmers in White River stopped producing citrus in the 1950's and
1960's. Downstream from the gorge, it is hotter and relative humidity is thus lower and
Citrus psylla does not thrive. The heat experienced here inactivates the bacteria further.
There are still large citrus growers near Nelspruit (above the gorge).
Macadamia. Macadamias grow well above the gorge (HoItzhauzen, 2004) and production is
expanding (Malan, 2004), but growing conditions in other areas, such as in White River, are
better (higher lying country, red soils which are more weathered with a higher clay content).
Tobacco. Tobacco yields are higher than average above the gorge and a relatively large area
is under tobacco (Malan, 2004). Tobacco, however, requires high production costs and risk
is consequently high. Malan (2004) is of the opinion that the high income variability limits
the area under tobacco per farm.
Avocado. Avocados are more suited to a cooler climate with more clay than is the case
above the gorge.
Vegetables. Holzthauzen (2004) considers vegetables a possible crop above the gorge but
Malan (2004) contends that vegetables will be less productive in the sandy soils. Vegetables
do not appear to be an attractive crop even below the gorge where soils are more suitable.
Sugar cane has replaced vegetables downstream towards Komatipoort. This indicates that
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vegetables are not as attractive a crop as sugar cane. At one time the area towards
Komatipoort was considered as South Africa's winter pantry for vegetables as it is frost free,
but risk arising from pests and price uncertainty has lead to its replacement by sugar cane.
Maize. Maize can be grown above the gorge (Holtzhauzen, 2004) but profits from this crop
cannot be compared to that ofother horticultural crops and sugar cane grown downstream. It
is highly unlikely that water will be used for maize if it can be used for horticultural crops or
sugar cane.
Pecans. The area above the gorge is not hot enough in summer and not cold enough in
winter. Pecan production has shifted from these areas toward the Middle Orange River in the
North Western Cape.
Sugar Cane. As it is cooler above the gorge a longer growing cycle is required relative to
below the gorge. Sugar cane requires heavy applications of fertilizer, which must be even
higher on the sandy soils above the gorge. Some sugar cane is grown near Nelspruit but a
further cost is that it is a bit far from the Sugar Mill.
Paw-Paw. Paw-paws production is possible in the hotter climate downstream from the
gorge.
Mangos. Mangos are better suited to dry heat and do better downstream from the gorge.
Bananas. Frost is a problem near the river upstream. Yields downstream are higher.
The issue in a water market is not whether crops can be economically viable above the gorge
but whether this area will provide the same return per unit ofwater (allowing for transaction
cost and risk) as downstream. Bio-climatic conditions indicate that the area downstream is
more conducive to horticultural production which supports the downstream movement in
water entitlements. According to Holtzhauzen (2004) the area above the gorge can produce
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vegetables, tobacco, macadamias, citrus (naartjies), and litchi's, but because water rates are
high, farmers sell their water. This statement implies that expected profits do not even cover
water charges or that the farmer wants to keep water for possible future use or sale. This
tends to be supported by the phenomenon that the lease price is sometimes zero. The real
sale price, however, has varied from about R2000 to R12 000 (2003 Rands) per hectare since
2000 indicating a greater demand for more permanent rights. If the lease price is non-zero
then it would be more correct to say that the high opportunity cost for water (water price and
tariff) facilitates transfers. The seller of water is not only faced with the water tariff but the
opportunity income of renting it out or selling it.
6.1.2 Importance of risk and cash flow in crop selection
It is of interest why the major area in this basin is under sugar cane as incomes from other
crops are higher. Farmers see sugar cane as a lower risk crop than other crops, which partly
explains the choice of the crop (NOWAC, 1999). Sugar cane has fewer pests, is reasonably
drought resistant. has an established marketing and service structure that exists once a milling
facility has been established, has more regular cash flows and smaller fluctuations in market
prices, and requires less expertise and management inputs.
Some of these factors are further discussed:
(a) Uncertainty of supply of water.
The flow of the Crocodile River is highly irregular, which means that water management is
crucial. Sugar cane can still survive without irrigation although yields will be considerably
lower in the year ofdrought. The plant, however, will recover if conditions improve again.
Bananas and citrus will suffer not only in the current year but the following year's production
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is also adversely affected (Bower, 2004). During relative water scarcity, farmers can switch
their water from enterprises the least affected by reduced water application (sugar cane) to
those the most affected. Vegetables are generally under drip irrigation, which helps water
management, however without water no yield is possible. The uncertain water supply
explains why a farmer who had a large area under bananas and no other crops was keeping
almost double the volume of water entitlement than he actually applied. The retention of
'surplus' water entitlements as a risk management strategy is supported if this water is
needed in dry periods. Due to the uncertainty in water supply the unused water may be seen
as an existing lawful use of water and be given legitimacy.
(b) Positive cash flows at an early stage are desirable.
Income from sugar cane is earned during the second year depending on the harvest cycle,
while with horticultural crops the farmer has a cash flow problem in early years.
Holtzhauzen (2004) downplays this as he considers that newer varieties of macadamias and
certain citrus cultivars could come into production sooner. (Wolstenholme, 2004) agrees
with the introduction of early varieties but for many subtropical fruits the break-evens of
incomes and costs are only reached after six or seven years. Cash flow data for this area
indicate that the highest gross margin for sugar cane and bananas is reached in the second
year, Valencias show negative gross margins for five years, while litchi's and mangoes show
negative gross margins for three years after which it gradually increases (Conningarth
Consultants, 1998). Macadamias have a negative cash flow for five years and break-even
after seven years (Macadamia Growers' Association, 2004). This may further explain the
relatively large areas under sugar cane and bananas. Conningarth Consultants (1998)
conclude that the so-called high yielding horticultural crops only show a higher return than
sugar cane from six years (grapefruit) to about 14 years (Valencias) at a four percent discount
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rate. At a higher discount rate sugar cane appears even more attractive.
(c) Marketing risk.
Sugar cane has an established marketing structure with product prices set by the local
industry. Farmers interviewed in the area exhibited a high level of risk aversion (down-side
risk), which further explains the attractiveness of sugar cane.
6.2 Characteristics of water buyers and sellers
A total of 18 farmers were interviewed, consisting ofsix buyers, nine sellers (six permanent
and three temporary) and three that were neither buyers or sellers. Although the number of
farmers is small, some of these farmers entered into several contracts, for instance, one
farmer leased from 12 lessors. The respondents were classified as either buyer or non-buyer
for the analysis. Due to the low number of permanent transfers encountered, short-term
leases of water were included in the analysis. Participants who lease water inwards are
regarded as buyers, and farmers leasing water outwards, or who did not participate in the
market are regarded as non-buyers. Participants who had both purchased or sold, and leased
water were only included once for the summary data. This classification resulted in six
buyers and 12 non-buyers (6 permanent sales, 3 temporary leases, and 3 non-participants),
which is a relatively small sample.
6.2.1 Water entitlements and land use
The total land areas farmed and summary of water entitlements owned by respondents are
presented in Table 6.1 overleaf. Buyers farm a larger area than non-buyers, but do not have
enough permanent water entitlements for the area planted, and have to lease or purchase a
large amount of water to irrigate their crops. There is also a wide range of sizes of buyers
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indicated by the mean and the median. These measures indicate that there is a positively
skew distribution of farmed area. This is caused by data collected from a company, that
produces 8000 hectares of sugarcane in this region. There are also two other buyers who
farm relatively large areas ofabout 1000 and 2000 hectares each. Non-buyers tend to own an
excess of water entitlements, which they might hold for times of drought, lease to other
farmers, or sell to other farmers.
Table 6.1: Area farmed and water entitlements before and after sampled transfers, Crocodile
River, 2003.
Farmed area Surplus (Deficit) Surplus (Deficit)
(ha) entitlements - after entitlements - before
transaction (ha) transactions (ha)
Buyers Total 12 156 (592) (1584)
(n=6) Mean 2026 (99) (264)
Median 809 (13) (89)
Non- Total 458 136 301
Buyers Mean 38 11 25
(n=12) Median 40 1 19
Source: van Aswegen (2004).
The data indicate that buyers who are situated below the gorge had significantly exceeded
their water use entitlements. These data include permanent water entitlements only, and
temporary arrangements could lessen the excess. Farmers downstream from the gorge have
rented and purchased in recent years to make up some of their deficit. In addition, farmers
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using drip and other advanced irrigation systems indicate that their usage is below the
prescribed allocation of 13 000 cubic meters per annum, which implies that they can irrigate
a larger area. For example, a one-hectare entitlement (13 000m3) could be used to irrigate 1.3
hectares if the irrigation method only uses 10 000 cubic meters per year.
Deacon (2004) contends that the excess use of water without enough water rights is
particularly a problem below the gorge as in his view farmers simply expanded production
even though they did not have entitlements to the water to support the expansion. He does
not have a problem with farmers who irrigate a larger area than their allocation if they use
drip irrigation as long as their volumetric entitlements are not exceeded. He contends that
many farmers far exceed their volumetric entitlements and that this has put the system under
stress. He, however, thinks that there is enough water in the system to justify current
entitlements ifevery famler only uses what he is entitled to. This view is somewhat different
from that ofComrie (2004) who is ofthe opinion that demand exceeds supply in the system.
Table 6.2 overleaf summarises the land use ofthe respondents. The main crops produced by
the buyers were sugar cane, bananas, and citrus while non-buyers produced more macadamia
nuts, mangoes, and avocados. The table shows the area under production for each crop type
produced by Buyers and Non-buyers. The number of respondents, the average area and
standard deviation is also shown. The large size of buyers compared with non-buyers is
evident in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Crop production of respondents in the Crocodile River Basin, November 2003
and March 2004.
Sugar Banana Citrus Nut Other Crop Vegetable
Trees l Trees2 Rotation
Buyer Area 9900 1256 862 37.2 61 40 0
(ha)
Number of 4 4 2 I 2 1 0
Buyers
Average 2475 314 431 37.2 30.5 40 0
Buyer Area
(ha)
Std Dev 3715.7 134.22 295.57 NA 41.72 NA NA
(ha)
Non-Buyer 55 0 102 132 70.6 50 48
Area (ha)
Number of 2 0 4 6 4 1 2
Non-Buyers
Average 27.5 0 25.5 22 17.65 50 24
Non-Buyer
Area (ha)
Std Dev 10.61 NA 19.67 16.91 21.68 NA 8.49
(ha)
1 - Macadamla and pecan nuts
2 - Litchi, mango and avocado trees
The median area under sugar cane is 907.5 hectares. The median is a better indication of the
situation because of the large area (8000ha) of sugar cane operated by a company that was
surveyed. Buyers grow relatively large areas of sugar cane, banana, and citrus, while non-
buyers produce on relatively small parcels ofland. This is probably due to the fact that most
(5 of 6) buyers are located below the gorge. The buyer located above the gorge purchased
more water entitlements so that he could sell a portion of his land. The buyers from below
the gorge mostly used purchased water for crop production and one farmer used the
purchased water for assurance of supply (security). The area below the gorge seems more
suited to large scale farming enterprises, since there are more relatively flat areas, hotter
climate, and better soils. The crop types grown by buyers and non-buyers are consistent with
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the earlier discussion ofcrops, given that most buyers were located below the gorge and most
of the non-buyers were located above the gorge (11 of 12). Sellers of water did not cease
production ofcrops in order to sell water but sold water that was not used for irrigation. The
reason for having an unused water entitlement was that it was too costly to pump the water to
the productive land.
6.2.2 Crop diversification
Crop diversification scores were calculated for buyers and non-buyers by using the
Herfindahl index (Pope and Prescott, 1980). A score of 1 means complete specialization,
while a score closer to zero shows high crop diversification. The average crop
diversification score for buyers is 0.73, with one farmer specialising in macadamia
production, and the average score for non-buyers is 0.70, with three farmers specialising in
macadamia production and one farmer specialising in citrus.
6.3 Problems with water transfers in the Crocodile River
Table 6.3 overleaf shows the water market transactions that occurred in the Crocodile River
from 1998 to 2003. The table was compiled from the records received from the DWAF,
which records all transfers ofwater allocations. These include transfers ofwater between the
same farmer to different portions ofland, and also water transfers associated with transfers of
land.
According to Table 6.3, the water market was active during the period 1998 to 2000, which
was also the case during 1994 to 1995 when Bate et al. (1999) conducted their study. Few
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transactions have been approved from 2001 onwards. Some farms comprise of several
irrigation plots explaining why the entries in Table 6.3 exceed the number of transfers.








Source: C. Ceromo, (2003).
Transfers of permanent water rights in the Crocodile River area have ceased and some
farmers say that the situation is chaotic as no applications are currently (2004) being
processed. The only transfers that currently take place in the Crocodile River are rental
agreements. This is in direct contrast to the situation in the Lower Orange River where
permanent transfers take a short period. According to Joubert (2004) the problem is that in
many cases there is no existing use and the seller must first apply in terms ofarticle 33 ofthe
NWA for the use to be an existing lawful use. Alternatively, the seller can apply for a
license. The seller must have been an existing lawful user for at least two years before
October 2002 (the legal application of the Act).
Joubert (2004) considers that the following two reasons may explain the lack ofapproval of
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permanent transfers in the Lower Crocodile River compared to the Lower Orange River. (l)
Availability of water in the Crocodile River is a problem while the flow in the Orange River
has been more reliable. This appears to be a major problem as the Crocodile River flow is
irregular. The normal flow ofthe river must be considered while other commitments such as
international obligations must be honoured. One can only think that transfers at present
complicate the water scarcity problem as all sales have been from farmers who did not use
the water for irrigation. (2) The Orange River is a Government Water Scheme, which
implies that farmers pay water tariffs for the area listed under irrigation (usually where the
State built a dam). Only a part of the Crocodile River is a Government Water Scheme as
other parts ofthe river (including tributaries such as the Lomati and Komati) are Government
Water Control Areas. The latter mechanism is created to control the water use in areas where
over-use is a problem. The payment of a water tariff is an aid to establish a lawful use but it
does not make the use lawful automatically. Other regional problems are lack of qualified
staff, which may explain delay in processing of applications as the region must visit and
verify the volume of transfers. Joubert (2004) also states that a farmer may keep more water
rights than what he actually uses in a particular year because he needs it as a security for
drought. The point is that water must not be wasted and use must be beneficial. As licenses
are not specifically described in the NWA he prefers to issue licences in terms of Chapter 4
of the NWA.
Cornrie (2004) at the regional office of DWAF in Nelspruit supports the view of Joubert
(2004). Comrie (2004) states that demand exceeds availability during dry periods. The
Kwena dam contributes a relatively small part of the water needs of the entire area
(Government Water Scheme), which means that a large part of the catchment area falls
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outside DWAF direct control. All permanent water transfers must be verified and supported
by the regional DWAF office at Nelspruit. Transfers of water from tributaries of the
Crocodile River would be irresponsible, as this will aggravate the situation ofwater scarcity
and the only route that Comrie (2004) sees is compulsory licensing. The reason why no
transfers take place is because there is no unused water to transfer. In future one would
expect that used water would be transferred. He concurs with Joubert (2004) that a farmer
could retain surplus water for dry periods.
6.4 Analysis of prices of permanent water transfers and rentals
6.4.1 Price trends of permanent water transfers
Table 6.4 overleaf shows average trading prices of water from 1994 to 2003. Data for 1994
and 1995 were obtained from Bate et al. (1999), which also included two transactions in
1995 recorded during this study. The table shows both average price ofthe transactions, and
average price ofwater weighted by area. The size oftransactions (ha) and prices are defined
in terms of area above the gorge, which allocates water at a rate of 8000 cubic meters per
hectare per annum. Below the gorge the water allocation is 13000 cubic meters per hectare.
The trends in average prices and number oftransactions recorded are presented graphically in
Figure 6.1 overleaf. The figure also includes the number of transactions that were recorded
during the survey. The number oftransfers shown in Table 6.3 for 2002 and 2003 are lower
than the number of transactions observed in Table 6.4 for these years. These transactions in
Table 6.4 have not necessarily been processed by the DWAF; the actual contracts between
farmers have, however, been drawn up and signed.
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Table 6.4: Real trading prices of water in the Crocodile River, 1995 to October 2003.
Year Trans- Total Average Std Dev(J) Min Max Average CV (%P)
actions Size transaction (Rlha) (R/ha) (R/ha) Water
(Number) (ha) Price Price/Ha(2)
(Rlha) (Rlha)
1994{4j 9 5.9 2547.6 1907.6 688.1 7164.5 4064.9 77.3
1995(4) 10 14.6 2672.0 1204.2 847.6 5063.5 2445.5 45.1
1996 1 141.4 6290.9 NA 6290.9 6290.9 6290.9 NA
1997 5 59.2 3547.3 1097.9 2895.7 5429.5 3276.0 30.1
1998 1 28.5 4064.3 NA 4064.3 4064.3 4064.3 NA
1999
,.,
80.0 6890.7 897.3 6309.6 7924.1 6922.0 13.0.)
2000 10 505.5 4760.2 1851.9 2444.0 7520.0 5863.8 38.9
2001 1 7.7 2312.2 NA 2312.2 2312.2 2312.2 NA
2002 5 230.6 2588.2 363.2 2117.9 3137.6 2860.2 14.0
2003 1 27.0 2500.0 NA 2500.0 2500.0 2500.0 NA
1 - Standard deviatIOn of the average transaction pnce
2 - Weighted average price: total price (R) divided by total area (ha)
3 - Coefficient of Variation = standard deviation divided by mean (Spiegel, 1961, p. 73)
4 - Data from Bate et al. (1999) included for these years. Two transactions for 1995 are from the current
study














































Note: Data from Bate et al. (1999) included for the years 1994 and 1995
Figure 6.1: Trends in real water prices (2003 Rands) in the Crocodile River, 1994 to
2003 (Average transaction price (R/ha)).
-77-
There is no apparent trend in water prices during the period 1994 to 2003, although an
increase during 1994 to 1999 and a decline during 1999 to 2003 are discernable. The high
price for 1996 is questionable as it is based on only one transaction and may be misleading.
The range, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation show that there has been a large
variation in prices paid per hectare. It appears as if the coefficient of variation in prices has
fallen over time, which will occur if information improves.
Prices paid by each individual buyer also vary substantially. Two respondents purchased
water from 12 and 9 different sellers. The average price received was R3245.49 and
R4468.32. The standard deviation was R1418.00 and R2220.73 respectively. Since there are
few buyers and many sellers, it is likely that there is an asymmetrical distribution of
information as buyers have better knowledge about availability and prices than sellers. The
price is higher for larger transactions, which may indicate that the bigger the area offered by
the seller, the more bargaining power the seller has and can thus negotiate a higher price.
There is expected to be transaction costs involved during trading of water. The buyer may
also pay a higher price per ha for a larger transaction than for many small transactions due to
relatively fixed transaction costs. Some of these transaction costs include lawyer's fees,
DWAF administration fees, search costs, and the cost of time spent on setting up the trade
(negotiation, search, administration, etc).
Prices vary within each year, most notably 1994, 1995, and 2000, as well as over the entire
period. This reinforces the notion that there is an asymmetry ofinformation, and possibly a
lack ofinformation in the market. Farmers can gain information through word ofmouth, the
main irrigation board, and the use ofattorneys. One major difference between this area and
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the Lower Orange River is that farmers make use ofattorneys when transferring water, while
farmers in the Lower Orange River primarily use the personnel at the Regional DWAF
Offices in Upington to gain information and broker the deal.
6.4.2 Rental price, water tariff, opportunity cost, and rate of return
Farmers enter into legal contracts for rental agreements usually for a period of one year
although in one case the rent period was stated as at least 40 years. One large lessee rented
from 12 lessors. The average lease paid for the 12 contracts was R95.04 per hectare with a
standard deviation of R21.26 per hectare. This is the price that the lessor receives for an
entitlement of one hectare at 8000 cubic meters per annum3, which is a price of 1.188 cents
per cubic meter. In addition to this, the lessee pays the tariff that applies to the entitlement.
The water tariffat present (2004) is RI 04.88 per hectare per year or 0.777 cents per m3 below
the gorge, and R68.40 per hectare per year or 0.855 cents per m3 above the gorge. The
following economic conclusions can be derived from these data: (a) it is clear that the lessee
has asymmetric information as rentals prices vary. (b) The opportunity cost of the water is
1.965 cents per cubic meter (1.188 cents plus 0.777cents) for a water user below the gorge or
R255.45 per year per ha (lha=13000 cubic meter of water). This is the gain that the market
attributes to the scarce resource water at the margin. (c) With a water rental ofR95.04 and a
water price ofR2573.5 (average for 2002 to 2003), the real rate ofreturn on an investment in
water is 3.7% (from this calculation water tariff is excluded as it is a cost to the lessor). This
statistic may be on the low side as farmers may pay more for permanent transfers in this area
as it gives them more security of future use. This statistic, however, questions real discount
3 The water allocation above the gorge is lower as rainfall is higher. As cubic meters of water are
transferred, a buyer below the gorge needs to purchase 1.625 hectares of water entitlement above the gorge
in order to obtain one hectare of water entitlement.
-79-
rates in water studies of often as high as 13 percent (Louw, 2001: 204).
6.5 Further analysis of farmer responses
The responses of fatmers regarding questions on their opinions of the NWA, and their
perceptions regarding the five-year license review period are discussed in this section. Other
responses gathered from the questionnaires are also analysed.
6.5.1 Farmers' perceptions of the NWA
Respondents were asked specific questions regarding the NWA. A five-category scale
ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' was used to elicit perceptions of the
san1ple farmers regarding specific statements relating to the NWA. The responses are
categorised as follows: SA - 'Strongly Agee'; A -'Agree; U - 'Uncertain'; D - 'Disagree';
and SD - 'Strongly Disagree'. Table 6.5 summarises these responses in three rows, with
each row representing a statement, which is given below the table.
Table 6.5: Summary of farmers' responses to statements made regarding the NWA,
Crocodile River, 2003.
1 'My OpInIOn of the New Water Act has become more positive since the Act was
first published'
2 'The New Water Act provides increased protection for the environn1ent, which
sets it apart from the old Act'
3 'The New Water Act has made the trading of water use rights (licenses) a simpler
process'
Category
Statement Total = n
SA A U D SD
1 1 5 7 4 0 17
2 2 9 5 1 0 17
3 1 3 11 2 0 17
..
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A total of 17 farmers responded to these statements. One farmer did not have enough time to
answer this section. There is, like the Orange River area results, much uncertainty regarding
the Act in this area. On average, 45 percent of respondents answered 'Uncertain' for the
three questions. The responses tended to be more on the 'Agree' side of the scale than
'Disagree'. There are more farmers who feel more positive about the Act than those who feel
negative. Part of this negative sentiment could stem from a lack of information available to
farmers concerning aspects ofthe Act. There is a lot of information available from DWAF,
and farmers are able to obtain a copy of the Act, however, much of the information may be
too technical and cumbersome for a non-technical reader. The second statement reveals that
farmers generally feel that the new Act offers more protection for the environment. The final
statement shows that farmers are very tillsure about trading ofwater under the new Act. This
is probably due to some of the problems with trading as mentioned in section 9.3.
6.5.2 Farmers' perception of the five-year review period
Farmers were also asked to rate (on a scale from 0 to 100) the importance of the five-year
review as a factor affecting their investment decisions (REVIEW in Table 6.6 overleaf).
Ratings close to 100 indicated that the review period would be a major factor, and zero
indicated no effect. Similarly, farmers were asked to rate (on a scale from 0 to 100) what
effect the five-year review period would have on the security ofwater licenses (INSECURE
in Table 6.6). Ratings of 100 indicate a high degree of uncertainty surrounding water
licenses, and zero indicates that licences are secure. Table 6.6 summarises these responses.
Some farmers were uncertain and did not give a rating.
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Table 6.6: Categorised scale ratings of review and security of water licenses responses,
Crocodile River farmers, 2003.
Aspect
Category
0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 Total
!REVIEW 6 0 5 0 2 13
~NSECURE 5 1 7 2 1 16
There is a fairly even spread ofratings for both REVIEW and INSECURE, with most of the
ratings falling within the middle and lowest categories. This indicates that farmers feel that
the five-year review period will have little influence on their investment decisions, but some
farmers are concerned and feel that the relatively short term of the review period will have
some negative effect on their investment decisions. This stems from the uncertainty
regarding the particulars of the Act, and regarding the practical implications of the review
period. This uncertainty also effects the fanners' perceptions of the security of water
licenses, and farmers mainly rate the security of water licenses as moderately insecure with
only three farmers feeling that licenses would be completely secure (rating of zero). There
seems to be a lot of confusion amongst respondents regarding the process of licensing and
how the review period will be applied. The practical implications of the review period
should be made clear to farmers as it may be hampering further investment in iITigation and
development in the area.
The following chapter presents the results from an econometric analysis ofthe water markets
in each of the study areas. The procedures used include Principal Component Analysis,
Logistic Regression and Ridge Regression. There is some discussion of the results, but the




This chapter discusses the econometric analysis results from the studies in each area. The
results from the Lower Orange River will be discussed first followed by results from the
Crocodile River study.
7.1 Lower Orange River Analysis
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was undertaken on the variables hypothesized to be
important in the envisaged models as a high degree ofmulticollinearity between crop types
produced was suspected. To study whether a water market promotes efficiency in water use,
a logit model of Buyers and Sellers of water entitlements was estimated. An investment
model was also estimated to study variables that are associated (positive and negative) with
planned future investment in irrigation farming.
7.1.1 Principal Component Analysis of variables associated with water marketing
Table 7.1 overleaf shows the loadings of two principal components extracted from the
original variables. The correlation matrix was used for the extraction, since the variables use
different units ofmeasurement. The first, second and third components with eigenvalues of
6.172, 1.905, and 1.608 respectively, account for 38.58, 11.91, and 10.05 percent ofthe total
variation in original variables, respectively. The table shows the variable name, and an
explanation of what that variable measures in the first two columns. The principal
component loadings are shown in the last three columns.
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Table 7.1: First three components ofvariables associated with water marketing in the Lower
Orange River, 2003.
VARIABLE
Definition PCI PC2 PC3
EXPINV The farmers expected change in irrigation investment 0.487 0.234 0.688
expressed as a percentage of current investment
TYPE Dummy variable: =1 if respondent is a Buyer in the
0.216water market; =0 if respondent is a Seller in the 0.853 -0.137
market
PERCEXP Percentage of entire crop planted to export grapes 0.942 -0.033 0.070
PERCOTH Percentage of entire crop planted to wine, juice -0.708 -0.314 -0.081
and/or raisin grapes
PERCFLD Percentage of entire crop planted to field I crops
-0.623 0.306 0.089
PERCHRT Percentage of entire crop planted to horticultural-
0.481 0.267 -0.274crops
PIRRTEC Percentage of irrigated area irrigated using advanced
0.962 -0.110 -0.023irrigation (drip or micro)
TNVWAT Turnover per cubic meter of water used for irrigation
0.939 -0.082 0.063
LSTOCK Number of commercial livestock owned
0.251 0.339 0.496
CROPDl Crop diversification score
0.540 -0.353 0.204
RISKATT Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient
0.224 -0.521 -0.359
DEBT Debt to Asset ratio
-0.370 0.454 0.058
REVIEW Importance of five-year license review on investment
decision, rated 0 to 100: 0 = no effect and 100 = 0.377 0.710 -0.253
major factor negatively affecting investment decision
INSECURE Index measuring farmers' perception of insecurity of
0.268 0.528 -0.470licences
PROFITS Dummy variable: =1 if respondent expects profits to
-0.465 0.146 0.430increase in the future; =0 otherwise
DEVEL Degree of development, measured as the ratio of the
0.649 0.162 -0.315current farmed area to the total available farm area
I - Lucerne, cotton, maIze and wheat
2 - Citrus, pecan nuts, mangoes and melons
The first component (Table 7.1) is the first PC from an analysis of the variables describing
the sample of respondents to be used in the logit model. It shows positive loadings for the
following variables; Buyers of water entitlements (TYPE = 1); percentage of cropped area
planted to export table grapes (PERCEXP); percentage of advanced irrigation technology
used (PIRRTEC); turnover per cubic meter of water applied (TNVWAT). It also shows a
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negative loading for percentage of cropland planted to other grapes (PERCOTH). This
component captures variables associated with the purchase of water entitlements and could
be labeled "Buyer characteristics". The second component shows positive loadings for
REVIEW and INSECURE indicating that farmers who feel that the license review will have
an impact on their investment decisions also tend to perceive that these licenses are insecure.
These two measures are based on perceptions surrounding water licenses and it is
understandable that they are related. The PC also indicates that these types offarmers are less
risk averse (RISKATT), which is not an anticipated relationship. The third component in
Table 7.1 shows the loadings of the third PC. It shows positive loadings for the change in
expected investment (EXPINV), the number of livestock owned (LSTOCK), and expected
profits (PROFITS). It shows negative loadings for the farmer's risk aversion coefficient
(RISKATT) and the perceived insecurity of licenses index (INSECURE). These
relationships are important findings, which will be further investigated with an investment
model.
In order to overcome likely multicollinearity between crops produced and to maintain
degrees of freedom, an index (principal component) was constructed from the crop variables.
The crop variables were chosen as the demand for water as a factor of production is a
derived demand, derived from expected product prices. Since export grapes (PERCEXP)
fetch premium prices, it is expected that producers ofthis product will be Buyers ofwater in
the market as the strong association is evident in the first component. The loadings of the
crop variables are shown in Table 7.2 overleaf.
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PCl scores are labeled as EXPORTPC as they are higher for farmers who produce
proportionately more export grapes (PERCEXP), and to a lesser extent, proportionately more
horticultural crops (PERCHRT), and proportionately less 'other' grapes (PERCOTH) and
field crops (PERCFLD).
7.1.2 Logit model of Buyers and Sellers of water entitlements
The dependent variable TYPE was regressed on the variables shown in Table 7.1 excluding
the crop variables, which were included as a principal component. The PIRRTEC and
TNVWAT variables were highly collinear with the EXPORTPC variable from the PCA, and
were excluded from the model. The variable with the most statistically significant estimated
coefficient (Table 7.3, overleaf) was EXPORTPC (Wald=6.8). The Wald statistic (which has
a X
2
distribution) can be approximated by the t-squared statistic, implying that the t statistic =
2.6 for the EXPORTPC variable. The t statistic has a normal distribution but Wald can be
approximated by t-squared for larger samples of at least 30 cases (Ndlovu, 2004).
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This indicates that Buyers ofwater entitlements produce proportionately more export grapes,
to a lesser extent, horticultural crops while proportionately less 'other' grapes and field crops
are produced. Buyers ofwater entitlements appear to have more livestock (t=I.14), which is
seen as a liquidity variable. Buyers are also less diversified (t=I.24) and only use water on
the high value crops. This captures the phenomenon that Buyers are the more specialized
farmers (table grapes) and hence substitute excess water rights for crop diversification.
Table 7.3: First logit regression of Buyers and Sellers of water entitlements, Lower
Orange River, 2003.
Beta
Coefficient Standard Wald Degrees of Significance
Estimate Error (B) Statistic Freedom Level
EXPORTPC
2.937 1.129 6.763 1 .009
CROPDI 5.408 4.367 1.534 1 .216
LSTOCK 0.007 0.006 1.302 1 .254
Constant -2.979 1.967 2.293 I .130
The Cox and Snell R-Square value is 60.6 and the Nagelkerke R-Square value is 81.3
percent. Cox and Snell's R-Square is an attempt to imitate the interpretation of multiple R-
Square based on the likelihood, but its maximum is often less than one. The Nagelkerke R-
Square is a modification of the former, which divides the Cox and Snell R-square by its
maximum in order to achieve a measure that ranges from zero to one (Ndlovu, 2004). The
model chi-square value is 15.217 with three degrees of freedom, which is significant at the
one percent level, and thus there is a significant relationship between the dependent variable
and the set ofindependent variables. The Hosmer and Lemeshow (H-L) test chi-square value
is 7.493, which yields a p value (significance) of 0.379. If the H-L goodness-of-fit test
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statistic is greater than .05, the null hypothesis that the data were generated by the model
fitted is not rejected. This implies that the model's parameter estimates fit the data at an
acceptable level. The model fits the data well, and the variation explained by the model is
statistically significant. The overall correct classification ofthe model was 91.4% while the
classification for Buyers was 86.7% and Sellers was 95% (Table 7.4). The model was not
tested on new data, as the sample size was already small. The aim of this model is not
prediction, so this information is useful as an indication of fit ofthe model. These estimates,
however, are biased, as the same data were used to both estimate the model and to assess
classification accuracy.
Table 7.4: Classification of observed and predicted values of Buyers and Sellers of water





Type Seller (0) Buyer (1)
Seller (0) 19 1 95.0
Buyer (1) 2 13 86.7
Overall percentage 91.4
The livestock variable measures the number ofcommercial livestock owned by the farmer.
Most of the farmers that owned livestock had second farms in another area away from the
main cropping farm. The variable may have some impact on farmers' decision making
processes, but since the operation was geographically separate to the study area, it was felt
that this variable should be dropped from the model. According to Table 7.5 overleaf, if the
livestock variable is dropped then a variable capturing the short review period (REVIEW)
enters. This implies that the short five-year review period of water licenses has a negative
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impact on the purchase of water use entitlements (licenses). The model in Table 7.5 has the
same classification rate as the model in Table 7.3.
Table 7.5: Second logit regression of Buyers and Sellers of water entitlements, Lower
Orange River, 2003.
Beta
Coefficient Standard Wald Degrees of Significance
Estimate Error (B) Statistic Freedom Level
EXPORTPC
4.173 1.470 8.057 1 .005
CROPDI 6.585 5.398 1.488 1 .223
REVIEW -0.030 .023 1.644 1 .200
Constant -1.061 2.365 0.201 1 .654
Although models in tables 7.3 and 7.5 have identical classification rates, the equation in
Table 7.5 is a somewhat better economic model as it has a less statistically significant
constant term. More variation is explained by variables studied and the Wald criteria ofthese
variables are marginally higher. Some statistics of the model in Table 7.5 are marginally
lower. The Cox and Snell R-Square is 60.2 and the Nagelkerke R-Square value is 80.8
percent.
7.1.3 Irrigation investment model
An investment model was estimated where the dependent variable is the percentage that
farmers expect to increase or decrease their investment (in Rands) in irrigation. This
regression suffered from high multicollinearity as measured by VIF values. The VIF value
for the variables PIRRTEC, TNVWAT, PERCEXP and TYPE were 32.249,18.123, 12.936
and 11.518, respectively. These values are in excess of 10, which indicates an R2 value, as
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measured in auxiliary regressions ofeach independent variable against the other independent
variables, of over 0.90 (Kleinbaum et al., 1988: 210). A Ridge Regression was thus
undertaken to reduce multicollinearity. The results ofthis regression are shown in Table 7.6.
The model basically explains future investment as a function of expected profits, farmers'
risk attitude, and possibly liquidity. These variables are supported by economic theory.
Future investments are also expected to be influenced by expected real interest rates. This
variable was not included as farmers may not be sufficiently familiar with changes in macro-
economic variables while different farmers face different opportunity costs of capital. The
R-squared value is 0.553, which is considered good given the conceptual nature ofthe model.
The F value for the model is 5.15, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
indicating that all the variables are jointly significant. A ridge trace has shown that
regression coefficients stabilize after a biasing constant of K=0.15, while the multiple
regression coefficient declines only modestly before this point.
Table 7.6: Ridge regression of factors affecting future irrigation investment, Lower Orange
River, 2003.
Beta Standard




PERCEXP 0.098 0.079 0.176 1.237
PERCOTH -0.224 0.089 -0.335 -2.522
LSTOCK 0.009 0.004 0.284 2.346
CROPDI 18.246 11.730 0.196 1.556
RISKATT -0.216 0.134 -0.195 -1.611
INSECURE -0.133 0.068 -0.239 -1.953
Constant 20.694 9.132 0.000 2.266
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The crop variable coefficient estimates indicate that table grape producers (PERCEXP) will
invest more and that producers of other grapes (PERCOTH) will invest less. Future
investment is highly dependent on expected profits. The signs of these coefficients are
expected as current income per hectare from table grapes (R130 000) significantly exceeds
that of wine grapes (R40 000) or raisins (R30 000). Farmers with more livestock are
expected to invest more. This may be attributed to a better liquidity position ofthese farmers
(livestock is a liquid asset as it may be sold during adverse conditions).
More risk averse farmers are expected to invest less as the RISKATT coefficient (APARA)
was negative. This study indicates that irrigation farmers along the Lower Orange River are
highly risk averse, especially as far as downside risk is concerned. The implication is that
policies that increase the risk in agriculture, such as a relatively short water license review
period, will have a significant negative effect on future investment in irrigation as these
farmers will attach a greater cost to this risk. The extent to which this will impact on future
investment is difficult to determine since the risk aversion coefficient has no particular cost
basis, and different farmers will place a different weighting to risk as a determinant of their
future investment. Farmers who feel that water licenses are not secure (high scores for
INSECURE) are further expected to invest less. The fact that both the RISKATT variable
and the INSECURE variable entered is of interest as both variables measure different
dimensions of risk. For instance a risk-neutral farmer will invest less ifhe feels less secure
about his water license.
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7.2 Crocodile River Analysis
In this section, the econometric analysis of the survey data from the Crocodile River is
described and the results are presented.
7.2.1 Principal Component Analysis of variables associated with water trading
Variables associated with areas under irrigation by Buyers and Sellers were studied using
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The correlation matrix was used for the extraction of
the components, since the variables use different units of measurement. This avoids the
problem ofassigning a greater weight to a variable simply because ofa much larger variance
in the variable. The first two components are shown in Table 7.7 overleaf. The variable
name is given together with a description of what it measures and the loadings estimated for
each variable for each component.
The first component shows that TYPE, CANE, and SIZE each have strong positive loadings.
The NUT and SURPLUS variables have negative loadings. This indicates that observations
that score a one for type (Buyers) also score highly for CANE and SIZE, which means that
buyers are likely to be large sugar cane producers. At the same time buyers are less likely to
produce nuts (macadamias and pecans). As discussed in section 9.1.2, sugar cane is an
appealing crop to farmers because of the drought resistance, liquidity and marketing
properties that sugar cane provides. In addition, due to the revealed risk averseness of the
respondents, these properties of sugar cane are even more appealing because they serve to
lower the risk faced from the farming operation by providing a relatively more stable source
ofincome and allowing some production ofmore risky alternatives. The NPV variable has a
relatively weak negative loading in this component. This indicates that farmers with a
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relatively high Net Present Value (NPV) from crop gross margins per cubic meter of water
are more likely to be sellers of water entitlements.
Table 7.7: Definition of variables associated with water trading, and their principal
component loadings, Crocodile River, 2003.
Variable Definition Component
1 2
TYPE = 1 if participant is a buyer; 0 if non- .740 .443
buyer (Dependent variable)
CANE Percentage of total crop planted to sugar .806 .246
cane
BANANA Percentage of total crop planted to .320 .184
banana
CITRUS Percentage of total crop planted to citrus .188 .062
NUT Percentage of total crop planted to
-.747 .417
macadamia or pecan trees
VEGETBLE Percentage of total crop planted to
-.046 -.682
vegetable crops
OTHTREE Percentage of total crop planted to
-.248 -.253
avocado, litchi andlor mango trees
SURPLUS The difference between total water
entitlements owned and irrigated area -.647 -.206
prior to market transactions
CROPDI Index measuring degree of crop
-.438 .690diversification
NPV Net present value of gross margin stream
-.561 .743of crops per cubic meter of water used
SIZE Size of cropped area in hectares .647 .321
EIGENVALUE 3.301 2.171
PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED 30.010 19.734
It appears as ifwater has moved to lower risk users and that some income may be sacrificed.
This supports Bate et al. (1999) conclusion. The remaining component does not indicate any
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further relationships with TYPE. The second component suggests that fmmers who have a
higher NPV are more specialized and produce less vegetables, with some evidence that they
may produce more nuts (macadamia and/or pecan).
7.2.2 Estimated Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficients
Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion coefficients were calculated for five farmers. The
elicitation ofresponses that were needed for calculation of these scores had to be done during
personal interviews due to the nature of the questions. Of the seven farmers personally
interviewed, one respondent was not the chiefdecision maker, and another farmer refused to
answer the question. With this limited data, no comparisons between Buyers and Non-buyers
can be made. The median APARA coefficient for the five Crocodile River farmers measured
1.28, which was slightly lower the estimate of 2.44 for the Orange River Study. It is clear
that irrigation farmers are risk averse, and when downside risk is measured, the farmers are
more risk averse than anticipated in the questionnaire, as almost all the farmers in the
Crocodile study and in the Orange River study picked the most risk-averse category (an
APARA coefficient of3.28). Farmers would rather receive nothing (choice 1) than being
given a 50 percent chance of winning R800 000 and 50 percent chance of losing R200 000
(choice 2). A risk neutral person will be indifferent between choice 2 and receiving R300000
with certainty. It is possible that only those who are risk averse have been able to survive in
an uncertain environment.
When faced with the chance that money could be won or lost, the farmers chose not to take
the risk but would rather take a certain amount with zero gain. They were not asked whether
they would pay money to avoid taking the risk. The importance of these findings is that a
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cost is attached to risk and whether weather-induced or policy-induced (insecurity of
licenses) this risk will negatively affect investment in irrigation.
7.2.3 Statistical modelling of Buyers and Non-buyers of water in the Crocodile River
Area
Due to the dichotomous dependent variable, a Linear Probability Model (LPM) was used to
estimate the relationship between explanatory variables and the dependent (TYPE) variable.
Due to likely collinearity between the explanatory variables mentioned, ridge regression was
employed in conjunction with the LPM. Once lease observations were included, the data
consisted of eight Buyers and 13 Non-buyers.
7.2.4 Linear probability model of water Buyers versus Non-buyers
Although there are problems with using this technique, it is applied as a first step in the
analysis. The problems in estimation of LPM are non-normality of disturbances (the error
term follows a binomial distribution), heteroscedastic variances of disturbances, and
predicted Y values do not necessarily fall within the range of zero to one. In addition, the
computed R2 value is not a good indication of model fit and is likely to be much lower than
one (Gujarati, 1995: 542-546).
The variables in Table 7.7 were regressed against TYPE using ridge regression. The ridge
trace indicated that regression coefficients stabilize after K=0.15 while the multiple
regression coefficient declines by about only one percent before this point. Table 7.8
overleaf shows that the model correctly classifies all but one of the cases and has a
classification rate of 95.2%. This classification rate is biased upwards as the same data is
used to estimate the model and calculate classification rates. The R squared value for the
model is 76.5 percent and the adjusted R squared value is 70.6 percent. For most practical
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purposes, the R squared ranges between 0.2 and 0.6 (Gujarati, 1995: 546). The F value for
the model is 13.00, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that all
the coefficient estimates are jointly significantly different from zero. These tests indicate a
good fit for a LPM, but the model is subject to the major disadvantages described earlier.
Table 7.8: Classification of observed and predicted values of Buyers and Non-buyers of





Type Non-Buyer (0) Buyer (1)
Non-Buyer (0) 13 0 100.0
Buyer (1) 1 7 87.5
Overall percentage 95.2
Table 7.9 overleaf shows the results of the ridge regression. The estimated coefficients for
CITRUS, NUT, VEGETBLE, OTHTREE, CROPDI and NPV were not statistically
significant and were subsequently dropped from the model and not shown in the table. All of
the remaining variables except CANE had estimated coefficients that were statistically
significant at the one percent level. The table shows that the most important variable
distinguishing whether the farmer will be a buyer or non-buyer is BANANA. The
SURPLUS variable shows that farmers who have a surplus ofwater entitlements prior to the
transaction are likely to be Non-buyers and farmers with no surplus or deficit are Buyers.
Buyers tend to farm a larger area (SIZE), and are likely to produce sugar cane (CANE).
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Table 7.9: Ridge regression of LPM of water Buyers versus Non-buyers, Crocodile River,
2003.
Beta
Variable Coefficient SE(B) Standardized B/SE(B) = t
Beta
Estimate
BANANA 0.923 0.199 0.490 4.643
SURPLUS -0.001 0.000 -0.337 -3.001
SIZE 0.0001 0.000 0.290 2.380
CANE 0.208 0.198 0.133 1.050
Constant 0.108 0.073 0.000 1.480
Note: Dependent varIable = TYPE
In short, Buyers farm larger areas with relatively more banana and sugar cane crops and do
not have a surplus of permanent water entitlements, and probably have a deficit. It is
expected that farmers who had a deficit of water would be buyers in the market and the
model confirms this. This is important since it indicates that farmers are striving to comply
with the system, and also indicates the markets ability to deliver water entitlements to
expanding farmers, although there are other constraints that reduce the markets performance.
It is interesting that the coefficient for the NPV variable is not statistically significantly
different from zero. This measure is not collected from individual data due to the time-span
of the survey and the volume of information required, but derived from the areas of crops
produced by respondents, and projected incomes and costs for each crop from the NOWAC
(1999) study and from the Macadamia Kwekers Vereniging (2004). The model suggests that
there is no significant difference in the NPV of gross margins per cubic meter of water
between Buyers and Non-buyers. This finding implies that the market does not lead to a
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higher value use of water4 . However, the market does allow farmers to transfer water
entitlements in order to plant more crops that are more suited to their risk preference (sugar
cane has lower income but less risk) thus allowing better management of risk.
7.2.5 Logit model of water Buyers versus Non-buyers
A logit model using the variables from the ridge regression model fails due to a near perfect
fit. The crop and crop diversification variables were used in a logit model to determine the
effect of crop production patterns of on the water trading decisions of Buyers and Non-
buyers. The economic rationale for this is that the other variables such as SURPLUS and
SIZE showed clear differences between farmers above and below the gorge, and self
evidently show their effect on the water market. It is obvious that farmers with a deficit of
water will be buyers of water in the market. Due to the topography of the land, farmers
above the gorge produce crops on relatively smaller parcels ofland compared with growers
below the gorge. For this reason, SIZE is also excluded from the model as it is also self-
evident that these larger growers below the gorge are able to expand production and hence be
buyers of water in the market. Since there is correlation between crops grown, the crop
variables were combined using a peA. Table 7.10 overleafshows the component loadings of
the crop variables, and their associated eigenvalues and percentage of variation explained.
4 This fmding should be considered cautiously due to problems in measuring the NPV ofcrops per cubic meter
ofwater. Problems encountered were the different time horizons ofcrops, rainfall differences between areas,
yield variation, differing costs of abstraction of water in different areas, and different irrigation systems. In
order to collect the relevant data, individual information about areas of crops grown using different irrigation
methods, the amount ofwater applied under each type ofuse, and yield, cost and marketing data are required.
This may yield a different result in the analysis.
-98-










Variation explained 29.8 % 20.5 %
The first crop PC (CANEPC) has higher loadings for farmers that produce relatively more
sugar cane and, to a lesser extent, citrus and lower loadings for farmers that produce
relatively more macadamia and pecan nuts. The second crop PC (BANANAPC) scores
highly for farmers with a higher proportion of banana, and a lower proportion of litchi,
mango, and avocado trees. These crop PC's were regressed on the dependent variable TYPE
using a logit regression model. The Cox and Snell R-Square value is 40.6 and the
Nagelkerke R-Square value is 55.2 percent. The model chi-square value is 16.972 with two
degrees offreedom, which is statistically significant at the one percent level, and thus there is
a significant relationship between the dependent variable and the set of independent
variables. The Hosmer and Lemeshow (H-L) test chi-square value is 9.892, which yields a p
value (significance) of 0.195. This tests the null hypothesis that the data were generated by
the model fitted. If the H-L goodness-of-fit test statistic is greater than .05, the null
hypothesis that there is no difference between the observed and model-predicted values ofthe
dependent is not rejected, implying that the model's estimates fit the data at an acceptable
level. This does not mean that the model necessarily explains much of the variance in the
dependent variable, only that however much or little it does explain is statistically significant.
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This indicates that the model fits the data moderately well, and the variation explained by the
model is significant. Table 7.11 shows the classification rate of the model's prediction rate
of Buyers and Non-buyers.
Table 7.11: Classification of observed and predicted values of Buyers and Non-buyers of





Type Non-Buyer (0) Buyer (1)
Non-Buyer (0) 11 2 84.6
Buyer (1) 1 7 87.5
Overall percentage 85.7
The overall classification rate is 85 percent, with 84 percent ofNon-buyers and 87 percent of
Buyers being correctly classified. The aim ofthis model is not prediction, so this information
is only useful as an indication of fit of the model, although since the same data is used to
estimate the model and to test its classification rate, these rates are upwardly biased and
should not be the only measure of fit used. In conjunction with the tests of goodness of fit
described on the previous page, it can be concluded that the model fit is satisfactory. Table
7.12 overleaf shows the results of the logit regression of these two crop PC's on the
dependent variable TYPE.
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Table 7.12: Logit regression of Buyers and Non-buyers of water rights, Crocodile River,
2003.
Variable Beta
Coefficient Standard Degrees of Significance
Estimate Error (B) Wald Freedom Level
CANEPC 1.640 .789 4.321 1 .038
BANANAPC 1.433 .794 3.255 1 .071
Constant -0.983 .731 1.808 1 .179
Note: Dependent variable = TYPE
The CANEPC coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level, and the
BANANAPC coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The beta
coefficient estimate for CANEPC is positive which indicates that farmers that produce
relatively more sugar cane and citrus, with relatively less macadamia and pecan nuts are
likely to be buyers of water entitlements. The beta coefficient for BANANAPC is also
positive and shows that farmers with relatively more banana crop and less other tree crops
(litchi, mango, and avocado) are also likely to be buyers ofwater entitlements in the market.
The CROPDI beta coefficient estimate was not statistically significantly different from zero
and was excluded from the final model. The model supports the findings of the ridge
regression model shown in Table 7.9. Although the sample size is small, these results are in
line with a priori expectations and confirm a relatively apparent trend in the study area.
These results and the results from the Lower Orange River region will be discussed and
summarised in the next chapter.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Water transfers in the Lower Orange River and Crocodile River were studied to determine
whether water marketing has promoted efficiency by comparing which farmers are buying
and which farmers are selling water. Farmers in these areas were surveyed during
OctoberfNovember 2003 while a follow up telephonic survey was undertaken in the second
area during March 2004. This study complements a study on water marketing in the Lower
Orange River undertaken during 1997 by Armitage (1999) and a study by Bate et al. (1999)
in the Lower Crocodile River. The dynamic water market situation can be studied by
comparing the current study (2004) to the previous studies. The study also links up with the
current WRC study on the "Supportive role of the market mechanism in implementing the
provisions of the new Water Act" (WRC, 2004). Econometric procedures used included
principal component analysis, and logit and ridge regression. Results from the two areas will
be discussed separately. Results from the Orange River will be discussed first.
Water Marketing in the Lower Orange River
The profile of a buyer of water entitlements was a farmer who grows relatively more export
grapes and horticultural crops with relatively less raisin, wine or juice grapes and less field
crops; is more specialised in production; has more livestock and has a less negative view of
the five-year water license review period. The buyers ofwater entitlements tend to specialize
in the production of few crops that are highly profitable such as export grapes. Buyers
appear more likely to own livestock. Livestock are seen as a liquid asset, which may be a
means of financing water market purchases. The five-year water license review period
appears to have a negative impact on the purchase of water entitlements. This could be
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explained by the fact that the planning horizons for grape producers exceed five years and
these farmers require an assured supply of water for the duration of the crop's lifespan.
Export grapes and horticultural crops are seen as more profitable alternatives, which require
intensive investment in advanced irrigation systems. High quality export grapes require heat
and water, with no heavy rainstorms that can damage the grapes. Areas such as Kakamas are
more suited to the production of table grapes than other areas such as Boegoeberg and water
tends to be purchased by farmers in Kakamas. The water market has facilitated a transfer of
water use from relatively lower value crops to relatively higher value crops, and also
promoted the use of more advanced irrigation, although this is an indirect effect, since the
irrigation type is dependent on the requirements of the crop and strategy ofthe farmer. From
this evidence, it is apparent that the water market meets the objective of improving the
efficiency of water use and allows flexibility of water allocations. The transfer of water out
ofBoegoeberg has no negative employment effects on this area, as the transferred water was
not previously used for irrigation. Sellers are compensated through the selling price of the
water and are only selling excess water and not ceasing irrigation.
Transfers often result in the use ofmore water from the resource, since farmers who do not
use excess water are usually the first to sell and the unused water gets put to use. For this
reason it is important that the water resource can support the initial allocation ofentitlements.
In addition, it may be necessary to have clear rules regarding transfers of water during
drought years as transfers ofunused water will increase the pressure on the already stressed
resource during these times.
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Water prices in real terms have increased gradually from 1997 to 1999 with the price settling
at around RIO 000 (2003 rands) per hectare from 1999 to 2002. The price data for 2003 are
very thin (two observations), and likely to be unreliable. The water price increase is possibly
derived from the increase in the price of export grapes, which was caused by the weakening
Rand exchange rate. If this is the case, then it is expected that the price of water in the
market will fall due to a decline in the export grape prices caused by a firmer Rand. The
extent of the price decline is lessened by the declining availability of unused water
entitlements, which drives the price higher. The range ofprices experienced within each year
has decreased over time as shown by the coefficient of variation. This is expected if more
information becomes available.
A Ridge Regression was fitted to estimate variables associated with planned future
investment in irrigation farming. Factors which affect expected future investment were
shown to be expected profitability, risk perception and risk aversion. Export grape producers
expect to invest relatively more, while producers with a higher proportion of other grapes
expect to invest relatively less. Farmers who own more livestock also expect to invest more
in the future. Livestock is a liquid asset, and these farmers may expect to be in a better
liquidity position and able to make investments. Results indicate that farmers who are more
risk averse expect to invest less in the future. Policies that increase perceived risk in irrigated
agriculture, such as the 5-year water license review period, will have a significant negative
effect on future investment in irrigation. For this reason, uncertainty surrounding the
practical implications of such policies should be made clear through good communication
strategies.
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Results also show that farmers who feel that water licenses are less secure expect to invest
less in the future. This has important policy implications, and measures should be taken to
improve the perceived security ofwater licenses. This could be achieved by keeping farmers
more informed about the practical implications ofthe NWA and, specifically, water licenses.
The lack of information available to farmers is evident from the responses obtained during
the survey. The DWAF does supply information to farmers, and much information is
available via their website, however, relevant, simplified, and practical information should
also be supplied to farmers. In addition, policy makers should make use of feedback from
farmers to enable the pragmatic implementation of the NWA institutions.
Water Marketing in the Lower Crocodile River
In addition to the survey, information was also obtained from various other role players
(horticulturists, DWAF, legal experts, Irrigation Boards). Almost all the water trades
(permanent and rentals) observed in this study were from farmers above the gorge to farmers
below the gorge. Horticultural experts familiar with this area attribute this movement of
water to the better crop production conditions below the gorge. Temperatures above the
gorge are not hot enough for the heat loving crops (sugar cane mangoes, grapefruit,
Valencia's and bananas) and not cool enough for temperate crops that require cooler
conditions. A major problem in citrus orchards above the gorge is the bacteria Citrus psylla
causing greening in citrus. Crops that do well above the gorge are tobacco and macadamias
(although White River appears more suited for Macadamias).
The average real water price in this area in recent years (2002 to 2003) was between R2000
and R3000 per ha (lha= 8000 cubic meter) with no clear trend in real prices ofwater during
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the period 1994 to 2003. It appears as if the coefficient of variation in prices has fallen,
which is attributed to better information about market prices being available in more recent
years. The Buyers are large progressive farmers that purchase (and rent) from many sellers
(or lessees). Two respondents purchased water from 12 and 9 sellers while one farmer leased
from 12 lessors. As the prices paid by a single buyer (or lessee) vary it is concluded that
information is asymmetrical. Prices are higher for larger deals, which may indicate better
information by larger sellers and probably lower transaction cost on larger deals.
In order to study whether the water market promotes efficiency the data were subjected to
several statistical analyses (principal components, ridge regression and Logit regression). It
is concluded that in the transfer ofwater some attributes in the purchasing area such as lower
production risk (reflected by larger areas under sugar cane) and lower financial risk and
better cash flow (bananas and sugar cane) were more important than the income per cubic
meter ofwater. Water supply in this area is highly irregular, while farmers were found to be
extremely risk averse, especially as far as down-side risk is concerned. The standardised
Arrow/Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient for down-side risk was at least 3.28. The latter
number means that a respondent would rather receive nothing (choice 1) than being given a
50 percent chance of winning R800 000 and 50 percent chance oflosing R200 000 (choice
2).
Ridge Regression indicates that buyers ofwater are water-deficit farmers, large farmers, and
producers of sugar cane and bananas. Although this conclusion is self-evident it is
interesting that the estimated coefficient for the Net Present Value ofgross margin per cubic
meter ofwater used (NPV) was not significant. In a principal component analysis, the NPV
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variable was mildly negatively associated with buyers of water, which implies that Buyers
have a lower NPV than Non-buyers.
More farmers feel more positive than negative about the Act although there is much
uncertainty regarding the Act. On average, 45 percent of respondents answered 'Uncertain'
for their opinion regarding the Act. Farmers were asked to rate (on a scale from 0 to 100) the
importance of the five-year review as a factor affecting their investment decisions and the
effect the five-year review period would have on the security ofwater licenses. Ratings close
to 100 indicate that it is a major factor, and zero indicated no effect. Most farmers indicated
a rating between 0 to 60%, which indicates a moderate impact.
Possible reasons for difference in transfer time between study areas
Whereas the time taken to complete a permanent transfer in the Orange River is short (one
week to two months) almost no permanent transfers have taken place in the Crocodile River
in recent years and the process has stalled. Some experts are of the opinion that due to the
irregular flow of the Crocodile, the demand for water sometimes exceeds supply and that
there is no water to transfer. This is a contrast with the reliable flow of the Orange River.
Another expert is of the opinion that farmers below the gorge simply expanded production
without having allocations to support it. His view is that water allocations are not greater
than availability. Data collected show that Buyers below the gorge indeed significantly
exceeded their water entitlements and a main reason for buying and renting in water was to
reduce this deficit. Another reason for the short transfer period in the Orange River is that it
is a Government Water Scheme and reliable data are available on water users (they have to
pay tariffs). Data are thus available to establish existing lawful use, which is necessary to
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facilitate transfers. Only a part of the Crocodile River is a Government Water Scheme as
other parts are Government Water Control Areas (less is known about water use in these
areas). It is concluded that there are reasons why transfers at present are not processed and
role players should discuss these reasons and possible solutions before further action is taken.
This situation is clearly sensitive and should be treated in such a manner. Allowing more
trades from previously unused water in the wake of possible water scarcity may aggravate
future shortages.
This dissertation has found that water markets increase the efficiency of water use and
allocation ofwater entitlements (licenses) and serve to move water from a lower value use to
a higher value use. The main change that has occurred since the previous studies on water
markets in the two areas is that the wide range ofprices has narrowed in both areas. This may
be due to more information being available in the market as the players gain experience
through market participation and through time. Farmers generally feel positive about the
NWA although there is much uncertainty surrounding the practical implementation ofwater
licenses, which needs to be made clear by the authorities since policies that increase risk will
have a significant impact on investment in irrigation technology.
The contrast in the difference in the operation of water markets in the Lower Orange and
Crocodile River regions higWights the need for future research to be directed towards the
institutional constraints that increase the transaction costs of participation in the market to
unacceptable levels. The inability of the market to perform during conditions of drought in
the Crocodile River region is a serious problem, and a well-functioning market should
provide farmers with a tool to effectively manage drought by being able to lease additional
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water during such times. Staff at the regional DWAF offices indicate that trades were not
being processed due to the ongoing determination of the reserve. The allocation of these
instream flows needs to be studied in both hydrological and economical terms.
The expansion of production area beyond farmers' water entitlement availability is of
concern and raises the question ofpolicing and corrective action. Increasing the availability
of information about water users and their allocations may induce self-regulation and
compliance as pressure from other users is increased if water allocations are public
knowledge. The apparent lack of information in the market also needs to be studied, and
methods for improved communication between all parties involved must be determined. This
information would not only be useful to market participants, but would also serve to better
study and understand the operation of water markets, which would, in turn, provide further
opportunities for the enhancement of their operation.
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\.PPENDIX 1: Characteristics of Expansionary and Mature Phases ofthe Water Economy.
Item Expansionary phase Mature phase
Long-run supply of Elastic Inelastic
impounded water
2 Demand for delivered Low, but growing; elastic High and growing; elastic at
water at low prices, inelastic at low prices, inelastic at high
high prices pnces
'") Physical condition of Most is fairly new and in A substantial portion is.J
impoundment and delivery good condition aging and in need of
systems expensive repair and
renovation




5 Externality an other
problems
6 Social cost of subsidising
increased water use











\PPENDIX 2: Permissible Use of Water in South Africa.
;chedule 1 (National Water Act, 1998)
t. A person may, subject to this Act -
:a) take water for reasonable domestic use in that person's household, directly from any water resource to
which that person has lawful access;
(b) take water for use on land owned or occupied by that person, for -
(i) reasonable domestic use;
(ii) small gardening not for commercial purposes; and
(iii) the watering of animals (excluding feedlots) which graze on that land within the grazing capacity
of that land, from any water resource which is situated on or forms a boundary of that land, if the
use is not excessive in relation to the capacity of the water resource and the needs of other users;
(c) store and use run-off water from a roof;
(d) in emergency situations, take water from any water resource for human consumption or firefighting;
(e) for recreational purposes -
(iii) use the water or the water surface of a water resource to which that person has lawful access; or
(ii) portage any boat or canoe on any land adjacent to a watercourse in order to continue boating on
that watercourse; and
(t) discharge -
(i) waste or water containing waste; or
(ii) run-off water, including stormwater from any residential, recreational, commercial or industrial
site, into a canal, sea outfall or other conduit controlled by another person authorised to
undertake the purification, treatment or disposal of waste or water containing waste, subject to
the approval of the person controlling the canal, sea outfall or other conduit.
2. An entitlement under this Schedule does not override any other law, ordinance, bylaw or regulation, and is
subject to any limitation or prohibition there under.
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APPENDIX 3: Authority to Continue With Existing Lawful Water Use in South Africa.
Section 34 (National Water Act, 1998)
34. ( 1 ) A person, or that person's successor-in-title, may continue with an existing
lawful water use, subject to:
(a) any existing conditions or obligations attaching to that use;
(b) its replacement by a licence in terms of this Act; or
(e) any other limitation or prohibition by or under this Act.
(2) A responsible authority may, subject to any regulation made under section 26( 1)(c). require the registration
of an existing lawful water use.
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APPENDIX 4: Review and Amendment of Water Licences in South Africa.
Section 49 (National Water Act, 1998)
49. ( 1 ) A responsible authority may review a licence only at the time periods
.stipulated for that purpose in the licence.
(2) on reviewing a licence, a responsible authority may amend any condition of the
licence, other than the period thereof if:
(a) it is necessary or desirable to prevent deterioration or further deterioration of
the quality of the water resource;
(b) there is insufficient water in the water resource to accommodate all authorised
water uses after allowing for the Reserve and international obligations; or
(c) it is necessary or desirable to accommodate demands brought about by
changes in socio-economic circumstances and it is in the public interest to
meet those demands.
(3) An amendment contemplated in subsection (2) may only be made if the conditions
of other licences for similar water use from the same water resource in the same vicinity,
all as determined by the responsible authority, have also been amended in an equitable
manner through a general review process.
(4) If an amendment of a licence condition on review severely prejudices the
economic viability of any undertaking in respect of which the licence was issued, the
provisions of section 22(6) to (10) apply.
(5) A responsible authority must afford the licensee an opportunity to be heard before
amending any licence condition on review.
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APPENDIX 6: Farmer Questionnaire.
2003
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
WATER QUESTIONNAIRE
YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY
The main purpose of this investigation is to determine whether transfers (buy/sell) of water promote efficiency.
The questionnaire is to be answered by the farm's principal decision-maker.
SECTION A: PARTICULARS OF FARM
1.1) Farm name: _
Telephone Number: _
Years of irrigation farming experience:
1.2) Total water allocation:
Farmer Name: _
Years of farming experience: _
Age of farmer: ------
Actual water usage: _
1.3) What is the farm's debt/asset ratio as at 28 Feb 2003? _
1.4) Total number oflivestock on farm: _
1.5) What is your water tariff? (R/Ha): _
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1.6) Farm water use:
If you grow a crop for different products, please specify the type of product (such as table, raisin or wine grapes) and the hectares for each.
Crop Ha Irrigation system Irrigation Season Average Water Annual









1.8) How many more hectares can still be irrigated? _
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SECTION B: WATERRIGHTS PURCHASE OR SALE
2.1) Have you bought or sold any water rights during the past 5 years?
2.2) Details of purchase/sale:
~ Please begin with your most recent purchase/sale (2003. 2002, 2001, ... )
YES/NO







2.3) Is the buyer (seller) upstream or downstream from you?




IDistance I I I IKm
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Indicate with CV)




2.5.) What is/was/will the purchased water (be) used for?






• SpecifY quality: excellent/good/poor and problems: drainage/salinity/slope/ ...
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2.6) Transactions costs from transfer(what does it cost to trade water)
Transaction 1 Transaction 2 Transaction 3
Legal costs (registration) R R R
Agent commission R R R





Irrigation board costs R R R
Other Costs R R R
Please specify what other costs there were: _
2.7) Where did you get information about potential buyers or sellers? _
2.8) Did you buy/sell water rights from/to the same person on separate occasions? YeslNo: _
2.9) (If yes) Why? _
2.10) Is the transfer subject to the approval of the Irrigation Board? YeslNo: ------
2.11) Is the transfer subject to the approval of other water users? YeslNo: ------
How are they notified? ---
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2.12) Have you made any investments in infrastructure in order to obtain new water?
How much? R._-------
Changes in irrigation methods
YESINO: _
2.13) If you have changed ilTigation methods (since 1998) which lead to a reduction in your water consumption (such as a change from
sprinkler to drip), did you:
a) Sell water rights that were conserved through the change?
b) Irrigate a larger area?
c) Retain use rights for security purposes (for dry years)?
d) Since (c) may not be possible anymore, will you use water on a low-income crop (such as Lucerne) to be diverted to another use in a
dry year?
Please specify any of the above and elaborate:
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SECTION C: TEMPORARY TRANSACTIONS (WATER LEASING)
3.1) Have you leased any water?
~ Ifno, go to section D.
3.2) Details oftransaction(s):
Yes / No
~ Please begin with your most recent transaction (2003, 2002, 2001 ...)






3.3) Is the Lessee/Lessor upstream or downstream from you?





IDistance I I I IKm
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3.4) What is/was/will the leased water (be) used for'?




• Specify quality: excellent/good/poor and problems: drainage/salinity/slope/ ...
3.5) Why did you lease water?
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SECTION D: EXPECTATIONS
4.1) Do you expect to change your investment in inigation within the next 5 years? Y IN
4.1.1) If yes, by how much? (percentage change in rands invested)? See box below:
+ 50% Increase by half the amount already invested
(eg. R500 000 - will increase by R250 000 to R750 000 total)
0%- I No change
-50% Will decrease investment by half
~ % (Please select any percentage)
4.2) Do you expect profits from inigation farming to increase or decrease during the next 5 years? %
ego +5%, -5%, + 10%, ...
4.3) Have you made any significant investments in agriculture during the past 5 years? Yes I No
4.3.1) How much? R _
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~EcnUN E: WATEK lJ~E KECUtjNI~EUH YItlE l""lS VV 1\.1~K 1\.L 1
WATER USE LICENSES
Water use licenses must be reviewed at least every 5 years and are valid for a period no longer than 40 years.
5.1) How will/has this affect(ed) your investment decision?
Do you think that the 5 year period is to short and will have a negative impact on your investment decision? YeslNo: _
Do you think that it is unlikely that licenses will be revoked? YeslNo: _
Rate on a scale of 0 to 100 in order of importance:
100 - Will be a major factor affecting my investment decision
50 - Decreasing order of importance
o- Will not affect my investment decision
~ % (0 -100)
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5.2) The new Water Act and more specifically the 5 year review period will have the following ettect on the secumy U1 WCllCl U~I;" U""lh'''<J
Rate on a scale of 0 to I00 in order of importance:
100 - There is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the security of water use licenses
50 - Decreasing order of uncertainty
o- Licenses are secure
~ %(0-100)
The following questions relate to the farmer's opinion of the New Water Act (1998).
5.3) My opinion ofthe New Water Act has become more positive since the Act was first published.
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain "Disagree Strongly Disagree
5.4) The New Water Act provides increased protection for the environment, which sets it apart from the old Act.
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree
5.5) The New Water Act has made the trading of water use rights (licenses) a simpler process.
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain
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Disagree Strongly Disagree
SECTION F: YOUR OPINION OF WATER TRANSFERS
6.1) Do you think that transfers of water have promoted more efficient use during the past 5 years? Yes/No: _
6.2) Have your expectations regarding transfers from 5 years ago been realized? Yes/No: _
6.3) Have your expectations changed during the last 5 years?
IMore positive INeutral IMore negative I
Explain: _
6.4) Has there been a shift from permanent to temporary transfers or vice versa? _
Why? _
6.5) Are you concerned that you may not have enough water, and if so how do you counter this:
~ Plant a low-income crop from which water can be diverted Yes/No: _
~ Hold more water rights than needed Yes/No: _
Other methods: _
6.6) How have transfers effected the environment? _
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SECTION G: FARMER'S RISK PREFERENCE ASSESSlVlJ1.;Nl
The following questions relate to hypothetical situations in which you are faced with the option of taking a gamble or choosing a certain
outcome. The object is to determine that certain outcome for which you are indifferent between the gamble and the certain amount for each of
the following questions.
In each question the gamble (option 1) is based on a flip of a coin with heads or tails having different outcomes. You are then asked for
various values of option 2 whether you prefer option 1 or option 2 until a value is found where you are indifferent between the two options.
8.1) If you were faced with an option to take a gamble and the option to receive a sure amount, which do you prefer:
OPTION 1: A coin is tossed
HEADS:
TAILS:
You win R 1 000000
You receive nothing
OR
OPTION 2: You receive (with certainty):
I R 200000 I R 250000 I R 300000 I R 350000 I R 400000 I R 450000 I R 500 000 I R 550 000 I
8.2) If you were faced with an option to take a gamble and the option to receive a sure amount, which do you prefer:
OPTION 1: A coin is tossed
HEADS:
TAILS:
You win R 800 000
You lose R 200 000
OR
OPTION 2: You receive (with certainty):
I R 50 000 I R 100000 I R 150 000 I R 200000 I R 250000 I R 300 000 I R 350 000 I R 400000 I
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APPENDIX 7: Farmer Questionnaire - Afrikaans.
2003
UNIVERSITEIT VAN NATAL
DEPARTEM ENT LANDBOU-EKONOMI E
WATERBEMARKING
U ANTWOORDE BY HIERDIE ONDERSOEK SAL KONFIDENSIEEL BESKOU WORD
Die hoofdoel van hierdie ondersoek is om te bepaal of die koop/verkoop van water, die doeltreffende verbruik daarvan bevorder.
Die boer wat die primere besluitneming vir die plaas maak 1110et asseblief hierdie vraelys beantwoord.
AFDELING A: BESONDERHEDE VAN PLAAS
1.1) Plaasnaam:
Telefoon Nommer: _
laTe besproeiingsboerdery ondervinding: _
Boer Naam: _
Jare boerdery ondervinding: ~
Ouderdom van boer: _
1.2) Hoeveelheid water aanwysing: Hoeveelheid water verbruik: _
1.3) Wat is u boerdery se skuld/bate verhouding vir die jaar tot 28 Feb 2003 ')
(engels: "Debt/Asset ratio")
lA) Aantallewendehawe: _
1.5) Wat is u waterbelasting? (R/Ha): . _
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1.VJ \'V ('U.\.IJ l.U\;iU\.I1H15 Up U1C1 1-'100;:'
As u druiwe verbou. spesifiseer assebliefwatter tipe produk die oes yoor gebruik word (by. Tafel -, rosyne - ofwyndruiwe) en die hektaar van elk





1.7) Grand (Land) gebruik
la3080100byv.





- - - - -
1.8) Hoeveel hektaar kan nog besproei word? ~
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AFDELING B: WATERREGTE GEKOOP OF VERKOOP
2.1) Het u enige waterregte gekoop of verkoop gedurende die afgelope vyfjaar?
~ Indien nee, gaan na Afdeling C.
2.2) Besonderhede van aankope/verkope:
~ Begin assebliefby die mees onlangste aankope/verkope (2003,2002,2001, ... )
lA / NEE






2.5) Is die koper (verkoper) stroomaf of stroomop van u?




Dui aan met (---1)
IAfstand I I I IKm
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• Spesifiseer kwaliteit: uitstekend/goed/swak en probleme: dreineri ng/soutinhoud/hell ing/, , .
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.... _. __ ~_ .. _w_~ w_ . _£~£ £~ __ 'I
Transaksie 1 Transal<sie 2 Transaksie 3
Wetlike koste (registrasie) R R R
Agentkommissie R R R
Bepaling van volhaalbaarheid of
R R Ruitvoerbaarheid
Omgewingsgeskiktheid bepaling R R R
Tydverloop van transaksie
Besproeiingsraad koste R R R
Ander Koste R R R
Spesifiseer assebliefwat die ander koste is: _
2.7) Waar het u die inligting oor die potensiele koper ofverkoper gekry? _
2.8) Het u waterregte verkoop/gekoop aan/van dieselfde boer? Ja/Nee:
2.9) (Indienja) Hoekom? _
2.10) MOET DIE BESPROEIINGSRAAD DIE OORDRAG GOEDKEUR? JA/NEE: _
2.11) Moet ander waterverbruikers die oordrag goedkew-? Ja/Nee: _
Hoe word hul inkennis gestel: _





2.13) lndien u waterbesparingsmaatreels sedert 1998 toepas (byv. drupbesproeiing), beantwoord asseblief:
e) Het u die water wat u so gespaar het verkoop?
f) Bespraei u nou 'n grater area met die water wat gespaar is?
g) Hou u die gespaarde water vir sekuriteit in 'n droe jaar?
h) Sedert (c) nie meer moontlik is nie, sal u die water op 'n lae inkomste gewas (se lusern) aanwend wat dan gebruik kan word in waterskaars tye?
Verduidelik asseblief u antwoorde:
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A1<UJ£LINl> L: KUKITJ£KIVI YN TKANISAKISIJ£IS ltlU UK)
3. I) Het u water gehum of verhum?
~ Indien nee, gaan na Afdeling D.
3.2) Besonderhede van transaksies:
lA I NEE
~ Begin assebliefby die mees onlangste transaksie (2003, 2002, 200 I, ... )




3.3) Is humder/verhumder stroomaf of stroomop van u?




Dui aan met (-J)
IAfstand I I I IKm
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3.4) Waarvoor was die verhuurde/gehuurde water gebruik?




• Spesifiseer kwaliteit: uitstekend/goed/swak
3.5) Hoekom het u water verhuur of gehuur?
en probleme: dreineringlsoutinhoud/helling/ ...
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AFDELING D: VERWAGTINGS
4.1) Is u van plan om u belegging t.o.v. besproeiing te vergroot binne die volgende vyfjaar?
4.1.1) Indien Ja, met hoeveel? (persentasie verandering in u belegging)?
J ! N
+ 50% Belegging sal met die helfte toeneem
(bv. R500 000 - sal venneerder met R250 000 tot R750 000 totaal)
0%- I Geen verandering
-50% Belegging sal verminder met helfte
~ % (Kies asseblief enige persentasie)
4.2) Verwag u dat u wins uit besproeiing in die volgende vyf jaar sal verl11eerder of verl11inder? %
byv. +5%, -5%, + 10%, ...
4.3) Het u enige betekenisvolle belegging in besproeiing gedurende die afgelope vyf jaar gemaak? Ja! Nee
4.3.1) Hoeveel? R. _
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AFDELING E: WATERGEBRUIKE ERKEN DEUR DIE W ATERWET VAN 1998
Watergebruiklisensies
Waterlisensies moet minstens elke 5 jaar hersien word en is geldig vir 'n periode wat nie 40 jaar mag oorskry nie.
5.1) Hoe sal dit u beleggingbesluit bei'nvloed?
Beskou u dat die 5 jaar periode te kort is en sal dit u beleggingbesluit nadelig be"invloed? JalNee: _
Dink u dat dit onwaarskynlik is dat lisensies herroep sal word. Ja/Nee: _
Gebruik 'n skaal van 0 tot] 00 in volgorde van belangrikheid:
]00 - Sal'n groot faktor wees wat my beleggings-besluit affekteer.
50 - Verminderde volgorde van belangrikheid.
o- Sal nie my beleggingsbesluit be"invloed nie
-146-
~ % (0 - 100)
5.2) Die Nuwe Waterwet en meer spesifiek die vyf jaarlikse hersieningsperiode sal die volgende effek he op sekunten van Wl:lLC;' oVU' L....~.
Gebruik 'n skaal van 0 tot 100 in volgorde van belangrikheid:
100 - Daar is 'n hoe graad van onsekerheid rondom die sekuriteit van waterlisensies




Die volgende vrae handel oor die boer se mening van die Nuwe Waterwet (1998).
5.3) My mening van die toepassing van die nuwe Waterwet het meer positief geword vandat die Wet die eerste (I 998!l 999) maal publiseer is.
Stem beslis saam Stem saam Onseker Stem nie saam nie Stem beslis nie saam nie
5.4) Die Nuwe Waterwet voorsien meer beskerming aan die omgewing as die vorige Wet.
Stem beslis saam Stem saam Onseker Stem nie saam nie Stem beslis nie saam nie
5.5) Die Nuwe Waterwet sal die verhandeling van water gebruiksregte 'n makliker proses maak.
Stem beslis saam Stem saam Onseker
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Stem nie saam nie Stem beslis nie saam nie
AFDELING F: U MENING VAN OORDRAGTE
6.1) Dink u dat wateroordragte die meer doeltreffende gebruik van water bevorder het gedurende die afgelope 5 jaar? JalNee: _
6.2) Is u verwagtings met betrekking tot oordragte wat u 5 jaar gelede gehad het gerealiseer?
6.3) Hoe het u verwagtings verander gedurende die afgelope 5 jaar?
JalNee: _
IMeer positief INeutraal I Meer negatief I
Verduidelik: _
6.4) Is daar verskuiwing van permanente na tydelike oordragte (huur) of andersom? Ja~ee: __
Waarom? _
6.5) Is u bekommer dat u nie voldoende water het nie, en indien wel wat doen u daaromtrent.
~ Plant 'n lae-inkomste gewas waarvan water verskuifkan word.
~ HOll meer waterregte as wat ek nodig het JalNee: _
Ja~ee: _
Ander metodes: _
6.6) Watter invloed het oordragte op die omgewing? _
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AFDELING G: RISIKO-GEDRAG BEPALING
Die volgende vraag is slegs hipoteties. Die doel is te bepaal ofrisiko u belegginsbesluite bei"nvloed en tot welke mate. Gestel u het 'n keuse tussen 'n bedrag wat u kan kry
met sekerheid of'n bedrag wat u kan kry met onsekerheid. Watter keuse sal u maak in die volgende gevalle.
8.1) Keuse 1: 'n Muntstuk word opgegooi
Kop: U wen R 1 000 000
Stert: U wen niks
OF
Keuse 2: U kan met sekerheid die volgende bedrag wen. Watter van die volgende bedrae sal u liewers verkies en watter bedrae nie kies nie?
IR 200000 IR 250000 I R 300000 IR 350 000 I R 400000 IR 450000 IR 500000 IR 550000 I
8.2) 'n Soortgelyke vraag
Keuse 1: 'n Muntstuk word opgegooi
Kop: U wen R 800 000
Stert: U verloor R200 000 (u moet dit inbetaal)
OF
Keuse 2: U kan met sekerheid die volgende bedrag wen. Watter van die volgende bedrae sal u liewers verkies en watter bedrae nie kies nie?
IR 50 000 I R 100000 I R 150 000 I R 200000 I R 250000 I R 300000 I R 350000 I R 400000 I
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APPENDIX 8:Additional map ofNkomati Basin - Mpumalanga.
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